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THE DYNAMISM OF TREATIES
YANBAI ANDREA WANG ∗
ABSTRACT
How do treaties change over time? This Article joins a growing
body of scholarship focusing not on formal change mechanisms but
instead on informal change arising from a treaty’s implementation
in practice. Informal implementation is often murky, poorly documented, and may be indistinguishable from noncompliance. Yet it
is significant both doctrinally under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties—a set of rules for the formation and operation of
treaties—and in its own right, when it does not meet the requirements to be doctrinally relevant. Based on a deep dive into the
history of one of the oldest areas of continuous international regulation, infectious disease control, and drawing on insights from
scholarship on how domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions
change informally over time, I argue that (1) change in informal
implementation is often an alternative to formal change pursued
by those unable to achieve the latter; (2) the process of informal
implementation is akin to a strategic game in which a host of actors
struggle to move the practice of a treaty toward their own preferences; and (3) informal implementation-level change has the potential to be vast in scope and can precipitate legislative updates
later on.
Understanding that transformative change can originate from
the complex, decentralized, and oftentimes opaque world of informal treaty implementation raises new inquiries and impacts longstanding issues in international law. It asks, at the most fundamental level, what exactly written international law is—a blueprint
awaiting faithful execution or a departure point for further bargaining? It calls for a more nuanced understanding of compli-
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ance—currently, a central preoccupation in the field—since noncompliance can in fact be implementation leaping ahead of the
treaty as written. And it invites a normative exploration of whether
informal implementation is a cause for concern because it moves
treatymaking away from highly visible formal processes, or a
mechanism to be channeled because it could expand the voices and
influence of the disempowered.
INTRODUCTION
Treaties 1 have been in the limelight in recent years, from U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 2 and the Paris Climate Agreement, 3 to the leaked Executive Order calling for a moratorium on new multilateral agreements. 4 These explicit changes have occupied center stage. Yet,
subtler implementation-level shifts are occurring too: slashes to the budgets
of agencies overseeing treaties, 5 reduction and replacement of personnel
within those agencies, 6 and the rise of an “America first” perspective. 7 Such

1. I use the terms treaties, international agreements, conventions, and regulations interchangeably to mean those international compacts that are formally negotiated and memorialized in writing.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties similarly defines “treaty” to mean “an international
agreement concluded between [s]tates in written form and governed by international law . . . whatever its particular designation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. I recognize that these terms have different
meanings in other settings.
2. Aaron Blake, Why Donald Trump’s Move to End the Trans-Pacific Partnership Is So
Hugely Symbolic, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/01/23/why-donald-trumps-move-to-end-the-trans-pacific-partnership-is-so-hugelysymbolic/?utm_term=.4b58d81670b8. After U.S. withdrawal, the remaining countries negotiated a
new trade agreement—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—which incorporates much of the original pact entered into force in December 2018. James
McBride & Andrew Chatzy, What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.
3. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.
4. Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily Ritter, A Trump Moratorium on International Treaties
Could Roll Back Human Rights—Here at Home, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/01/a-trump-moratorium-on-international-treatiescould-roll-back-human-rights-here-at-home/?utm_term=.cf8681ada24a.
5. President Trump’s proposed budget for 2018 cut nearly thirty percent from the Department
of State and the United States Agency for International Development. Gregory Krieg & Will Mullery, Trump’s Budget by the Numbers: What Gets Cut and Why, CNN (May 23, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/23/politics/trump-budget-cuts-programs/index.html.
6. Jessica Schulberg & Alissa Scheller, Trump Gutted the State Department and Half of Top
Jobs Are Still Unfilled, HUFF POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donaldtrump-state-department-positions_us_58e3e8bee4b0f4a923b2ba5e.
7. Griff Witte & Michael Birnbaum, A Year of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda Has Radically Changed the U.S. Role in the World, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-year-of-trumps-america-first-agenda-has-radically-changed-the-us-role-in-
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informal adjustments to how treaties are put into practice on the ground occur
perennially, often below the radar of public attention and in the absence of
any apparent changes to the agreement itself. They can fundamentally alter
how treaties play out in the world. But their mechanism, scope, and significance are poorly understood.
This Article interrogates the simple question of how written international law changes over time. 8 It shines a spotlight on below-the-surface
changes that emanate from the way a treaty is informally implemented in
practice—what I refer to as “informal implementation dynamism.” As key
treaties age, there is growing concern about whether they are able to evolve
with the regulatory needs of the international community. 9 The past few
years have seen a flowering of literature on this question, 10 but existing scholarship focuses primarily on doctrinal rules in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention” or “Convention”), 11 formal flexibility
mechanisms built into a treaty at the outset,12 and the formal ways in which
a treaty is implemented by contracting states, such as by adopting domestic
legislation. 13 The Vienna Convention itself contains a controversial doctrinal
rule for folding certain types of practice back into treaty interpretation. That

the-world/2018/01/20/c1258aa6-f7cf-11e7-9af7a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.2f7f1fd6ad64.
8. Excluded from my inquiry is customary international law, which arises from the “general
and consistent practice of states followed . . . from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1987). Since customary international law is derived in part from practice, mechanisms of implementation change are built into its very definition.
9. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (2014);
CHRISTIAN DJEFFAL, STATIC AND EVOLUTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION (2016); Mónika Ambrus & Ramses A. Wessel, Between Pragmatism and Predictability:
Temporariness in International Law, in NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2014
(Mónika Ambrus & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2015); TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (Georg
Nolte ed., 2013); UNIVERSALITY AND CONTINUITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Thilo Marauhn &
Heinhard Steiger eds., 2011); Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237 (2016).
11. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets the rules for the adoption and operation
of treaties. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
12. These built-in formal flexibility mechanisms can include reservations, escape clauses, alternative rules for amendment that are easier than those in the Vienna Convention, and limited duration of the treaty. See B. Boockmann & Paul W. Thurner, Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral
Environmental Treaties, 6 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L., & ECON. 113 (2006) (surveying
the range of amendment rules in multilateral environmental treaties); Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility
in International Agreements, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 175, (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack
eds., 2013) (distinguishing between and providing examples of formal and informal flexibility
mechanisms).
13. See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1309 (2017).
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rule states that treaties must be interpreted in the context of “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.” 14 Much attention has been devoted to
asking what type and level of practice ought to have influence on interpretation, whose practice matters, and what degree of change this interpretive rule
should accommodate. 15 Yet, informal changes to implementation—for instance, through altering conduct, withholding funds, reorganizing offices and
personnel, or even noncompliance—have not received sustained attention in
their own right, despite their feasibility and pervasiveness. 16
Focus on what counts as change under doctrinal rules and formal change
mechanisms misses too much of the broader story concerning where change
comes from and how it is achieved. Take the regulation of infectious disease—one of the oldest areas of continuous international cooperation, dating
back to the mid-nineteenth century. 17 The most recent formal change occurred when the 2005 International Health Regulations (“2005 IHR”) 18 replaced the 1969 International Health Regulations (“1969 IHR”). 19 This revision was considered “[a] revolution in the governance of global infectious
disease.” 20 The scope of coverage expanded from three specific contagions

14. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(3)(b).
15. See, e.g., IRINA BUGA, MODIFICATION OF TREATIES BY SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (2018);
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its
Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 11–116 (2018) [hereinafter U.N. A/73/10]; Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 365–89 (2008) [hereinafter U.N. A/63/10].
16. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 12, at 178 (noting that scholars “have made considerable progress” in examining formal flexibility tools but have “given shorter shift” to informal flexibility
tools); Georg Nolte, Introduction, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 1, 3
(noting that “formal procedures by which parties to a treaty can accommodate change” are “either
only rarely used or do not pose difficult legal problems,” whereas “[i]n most cases, the evolution of
the context of a treaty must be accommodated by more informal means”); Gérardine Meishan Goh,
Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Development of International Space Law,
87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009) (“Where the traditional methods of international treaty-making
have proven insufficiently efficient or up-to-date, recourse to informalism and soft law methods has
provided the panacea.”).
17. For accounts of the early history of international infectious disease cooperation, see NEVILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK (1971); NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONFERENCES 1851–1938 (1975); Richard N. Cooper, International Cooperation in Public Health as a
Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation, in CAN NATIONS AGREE? ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Richard N. Cooper et al. eds., 1989).
18. World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations (2005), May 23,
2005, 2509 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter 2005 IHR].
19. WHO, International Health Regulations, July 25, 1969, 764 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969
IHR].
20. David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of SARS, 113
J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799, 799 (2004).
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to “all events which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.” 21 Self-reporting by state parties was supplanted by a broader
and more active surveillance system managed by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 22 and relied heavily on internet detection tools. 23 And, the
overall objective of the law shifted from preventing the spread of disease
across national borders to swiftly controlling outbreaks at their source with
unprecedented requirements for state parties to develop domestic public
health capacities. 24 On the surface, viewed through the lens of the Vienna
Convention and formal change mechanisms, this transformation seems to
have begun with a 1995 WHO resolution delegating the organization’s staff
to prepare an update for the then-in-force 1969 IHR. 25 It appears to have
ended with three weeks of intergovernmental negotiations in 2004 and
2005. 26
Digging below the surface, a different picture emerges. One WHO official retrospectively described the 2005 IHR as the “institutionaliz[ation]”
of policy decisions that had already been made. 27 The 2003 epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome—a disease not covered under the 1969
IHR—was handled in much the same way as the 2005 IHR would dictate two
years later. 28 The internet surveillance tools that would become critical under
the 2005 IHR were developed during the early to mid-1990s, predating the
1995 WHO resolution. 29 Reaching even further back, a 1976 outbreak of
Ebola—again, not covered under the 1969 IHR—elicited a swift effort to

21. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 6(1).
22. See infra Section III.C.
23. See infra notes 274–281 and accompanying text.
24. See 2005 IHR, supra note 18, annex 1.A.
25. World Health Assembly Res. 48.7, Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations, at 2, WHO Doc. A48/VR/12 (May 12, 1995).
26. The negotiations were called “Intergovernmental Working Groups” and held in November
2004 and February 2005, the latter of which was suspended and reconvened for a final session in
May 2005. See Revision of the International Health Regulations: IGWG-1-12 November 2004,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e/e-igwg.html (last visited May 10, 2019) (containing documentation on the first Intergovernmental Working Group held in November 2004); Revision of the International Health Regulations: IGWG/2 - 21-26 February 2005, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e/e-igwg2.html (last visited May 10, 2019) (containing documentation on the second Intergovernmental Working Group held in February 2005).
27. ALISON MACK ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GLOBAL HEALTH RISK
FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 22 (2016) (citing David Heymann, former Assistant Director-General for Communicable Diseases at the WHO).
28. See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Who Makes International Law? How the World Health Organization Changed the Regulation of Infectious Disease 192–222 (May 18, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author).
29. See infra notes 274–281 and accompanying text.
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control the disease at its source, similar to the epidemic responses now undertaken under the 2005 IHR. 30 In fact, as early as the 1960s and 1970s,
many involved in the implementation of the 1969 IHR pointed out its shortcomings and discussed the need for a novel approach resembling the 2005
IHR. 31
The 1969 IHR thus changed through informal implementation dynamism. These implementation-level changes did not constitute “subsequent
practice” for purposes of interpretation under the Vienna Convention, yet
their scope was vast, and they precipitated more formal, legislative updates
later on. While these developments are not accounted for by existing international law scholarship, a number of international relations scholars have
highlighted the politics surrounding the implementation of international
agreements and the internal workings of international organizations as key to
understanding how treaties are actualized in the world. 32 Scholars of domestic law and institutions have also investigated how the dynamics of informal
implementation generate change. 33
This Article ties together and adds to these disparate strands of scholarship by telling an overlooked narrative about informal implementation dynamism in the infectious disease context. Understanding treaty dynamism is a
“singularly important task,” with numerous scholars and practitioners calling
for investigations into “the dynamic process through which [international]
law changes and develops.” 34 Drawing from diverse literatures on how do-

30. See Wang, supra note 28, at 147–50.
31. See infra notes 188–199, 239–241 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Karen Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International Regime Complexity, 14
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 329 (2018); Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 13, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Alter & Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity]; Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362, 362–63
(2006) [hereinafter Alter & Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes]; Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 14, 18 (2012); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2005); CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2009); Laurence Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006).
33. See infra Part II.
34. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the
Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 12, at 34, 40; see also
GREGORY MESSENGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW: EXAMINING
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2016) (arguing that “accounts of . . . international law . . .
based on law as expressed through [judicial or quasi-legislative] decisions . . . at specific points in
time” are “distract[ing] us from appreciating that law develops continually and that snapshots . . .
are not adequate to explain how law develops”); Rene Uruena, Temporariness and Change in
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mestic statutes, contracts, and institutions change over time, as well as archival research at the WHO, I offer three sets of insights that provide a framework for thinking about change achieved through informal implementation,
why it matters even when it is not doctrinally significant, and how it is related
to formal change.
First, informal implementation-level change can be an alternative to formal change mechanisms. 35 Informal implementation-level change is often
pursued precisely because formal change is not achievable. Those displeased
with a treaty as written can try to bring about formal change such as its
amendment, judicial reinterpretation, or wholesale termination, but such explicit changes may require an unattainable level of consensus or impose unaffordable costs in time and resources even when flexibility mechanisms are
built into the treaty. 36 The proponents of change must then operate with more
stealth and less fanfare by implementing the agreement in novel ways. Implementation presents new questions or new permutations of old questions,
which, in turn, open up space to redefine the boundary between what the law
condones or authorizes and what it does not. Informal implementation offers
unique opportunities for change because the stakes are lower, the process is
less publicly visible, the circumstances are more concrete, and the actors involved are typically fewer in number and lower in the chain of command.
Second, the process of implementation is a strategic game that unfolds
over time, as a host of actors—often a different and sometimes a broader set
of actors than those empowered to enact formal change—struggle to move
the agreement toward their own preferences.37 Change is achieved through
three key mechanisms that are currently under-explored: (1) a treaty’s implementers may convert or redirect the agreement toward new ends through altered practice; (2) implementers may erode a treaty through neglect or active
resistance to adaptation in the face of drifting background circumstances;

Global Governance, in NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2014, supra note 10,
at 19, 25 (observing “international law’s theory of change is one of a constant present,” with the
new completely replacing the old “as if nothing had ever changed”); Jana von Stein, The Engines
of Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 12, at 477, 496 (noting that “it is worthwhile to start looking at the causal impact of international law through a different lens, which could,
for instance, involve studying changes in practice or implementation”); Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel,
Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127, 135
(2010) (calling for greater attention to the downstream processes by which treaties are translated
into action).
35. See infra Section III.A.
36. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000) (noting that hard law “entails significant costs,” including transaction costs, uncertainty, and implications for national sovereignty).
37. See infra Section III.C. I use the analogy of a game metaphorically, not in the game theory
sense.
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(3) implementers may shift management of the underlying problem to another institutional arrangement—be it another law or an unofficial policy, international or domestic, an alternative that is already in existence, or one created specifically for the purpose of moving away from the disfavored treaty.
This latter mechanism is particularly salient in the international context given
the fragmented and non-hierarchical nature of the international sphere. 38
Third, informal implementation dynamism is real change and not
simply gap-filling adaptations in the service of maintaining overarching stability. 39 This is so even when it does not rise to the level of being doctrinally
recognized as subsequent practice. These three mechanisms may look like
stability or noncompliance in the short-term, but their overall effect can add
up and become transformative across long spans of time. In many instances
in the history of the 1969 and 2005 IHRs, the scope of change possible via
implementation dynamism was far broader than what could be achieved
through textual amendment. Consequently, the laws looked superficially stable or were amended in trivial ways while sweeping changes occurred incrementally on the ground. 40 Over time, the strategic struggle of informal implementation can lead a treaty to stray unpredictably until what is happening
in practice bears little relation to the original intention of the treaty makers or
the words of the treaty.
Implementation dynamism is also real in that it can inform and facilitate
subsequent formal negotiations. In the case of the 1969 IHR, implementers
chose to avoid textual revision, opting instead for shifts in implementation
that might “prepare the ground” for a more formal change to the treaty at a
later time. 41 Those areas where implementers had developed new procedures, policies, or technical tools, and where they could point to an existing
record of successful operation, were subsequently the least controversial during the 2005 IHR’s negotiation. Implementing a change on the ground can
lower the barrier for an ensuing textual amendment by reducing the uncertainty surrounding a novel approach and altering perceptions or preferences
about possible future options.
These insights exposing the dynamics behind the ordinary, everyday informal implementation of treaties are long overdue. They were repeatedly
borne out in the history of international infectious disease regulation as implementers time and again pursued informal adjustments to implementation
when the same formal changes were considered politically infeasible or after
38. See Alter & Raustiala, supra note 32, at 329 (discussing the density of overlapping and
nonhierarchical rules and institutions that now exist at the global level).
39. See infra Section III.C.
40. See infra Section III.C (discussing significant informal changes made on the ground).
41. Memorandum from Boris Velimirovic, Reg’l Officer for Communicable Diseases for the
Reg’l Office of Eur., World Health Org., to Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of
Communicable Diseases, World Health Org. (Feb. 7, 1980) (on file with author).

836

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:828

similar formal proposals were rejected during negotiations. 42 Implementers
achieved far-reaching change in practice and, decades later, pushed for textual amendments when windows of opportunity opened. These observations
have parallels in the work of scholars investigating how contracts, 43 statutes, 44 and institutions 45 change over time.
This Article uses case studies to demonstrate the mechanisms and importance of implementation dynamism. 46 While the international regulation
of infectious disease has some exceptional qualities, 47 it provides particularly
clear illustrations of mechanisms that have been observed in other issue areas
as well. 48 Through an examination of international infectious disease law
over time, I show that the interplay between informal implementation dynamism and explicit treaty dynamism is complex. What looks like textual stability on the surface may mask underlying dynamism in practice. What appears to be a stark break from the previous treaty can obscure lurking continuities. Sometimes, shifts in practice followed from textual changes. Other
times, informal implementation changes leaped ahead and facilitated subsequent textual revision.
Understanding that treaty dynamism is varied and complex provides a
new lens for viewing foundational issues in international law and calls for
further study. First, more in-depth case studies are needed to ascertain the
extent to which the findings of this Article are generalizable across other areas of international law. Since informal implementation-level changes are
hard to detect over short spans of time and from readily available written
public sources, these studies must be longitudinal and examine the internal
workings of a myriad of implementers. Second, informal implementation
dynamism complicates our very idea of what a treaty is. The current downplaying of informal implementation in the literature suggests that written
42. See generally infra Part III.
43. See infra Section II.A.
44. See infra Section II.B.
45. See infra Section II.C.
46. This project is descriptive. Its methodology is historical process tracing of a longitudinal
case study. I do not assert that the insights illuminated by international infectious disease regulation
are equally applicable across all treaty areas. My goal is to uncover and generate hypotheses regarding a range of under-examined mechanisms of treaty change, so that more precise questions
can be formulated for systematic study. See HARRY ECKSTEIN, REGARDING POLITICS: ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL THEORY, STABILITY, AND CHANGE 143 (1992) (arguing that case studies can “stimulate
the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions”);
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 20 (2005) (noting that detailed analyses of historical episodes are advantageous for “identif[ying] . . . new variables and hypotheses”).
47. See infra Part IV.
48. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 32 (describing similar informal change processes in international trade and finance); DEERE, supra note 32 (describing same in international intellectual property rights).
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treaties are blueprints awaiting faithful actualization. In fact, treaties may
more accurately be described as departure points for further bargaining
among implementers as constraints and opportunities reveal themselves over
time. Cast in this light, informal change may be mistaken for noncompliance
in the short-term, and the concept of compliance—currently a “central preoccupation” 49 among international law scholars—may need refinement to account for the complex and bidirectional relationship between a treaty on the
books and its implementation out in the world. Third, informal implementation raises questions concerning its positive and negative implications as well
as who it empowers. Consent is currently at the core of treaty making and
has long been the touchstone of legitimacy. Yet, the findings of this Article
suggest that treaties can informally evolve beyond or against their text, potentially undermining the initial consent of state parties—particularly those
states with the most power in the formal negotiation process—and perhaps
lending a greater voice to disempowered actors. Further normative inquiry
is needed to test this hypothesis and to provide a theoretical account of these
power dynamics.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the formal mechanisms of change within the Vienna Convention, including a set of rules for
formation, amendment, and abrogation, as well as a set of rules for interpretation that have been the subject of much debate. Recognizing that the Vienna Convention does not adequately account for informal implementationlevel change, Part II gleans insights from scholarship on how contracts, statutes, and domestic institutions change over time. In each area of study, scholars contend that attention to everyday implementation reveals change not apparent or foreseeable from the written covenant itself. Part III presents the
central insights of this Article based on vignettes from the history of international infectious disease regulation. I argue that implementation is a strategic
game that takes place over time, that it empowers a set of actors who may not
be able to effect explicit change to the treaty, and that it transpires via three
key mechanisms that I describe and illustrate. Part IV takes a broader look
at informal implementation dynamism as a research agenda. I identify for
future exploration empirical, conceptual, and normative questions that arise
when written international law is placed in temporal context.

49. Howse & Teitel, supra note 34, at 128.
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I. AN IMPOVERISHED UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGE
Treaties, particularly multilateral ones, grew rapidly in number, scale,
and significance over the course of the twentieth century. 50 As these agreements age and the circumstances of their adoption become more remote,
many have asked whether they are able to evolve with the regulatory needs
of the international community. 51 This inquiry, however, has been largely
limited to the formal mechanisms of change found within the Vienna Convention, which sets the rules for the adoption and operation of treaties.
Focusing on the Vienna Convention and its formal rules for change has
superficial appeal. The Convention was intended to provide “orderly procedures . . . for dealing with needed adjustments and changes in treaties.” 52
Parts of the Convention have been recognized as customary international law
applicable to all countries 53 and even to treaties concluded before its entry
into force in 1980. 54 Most of the Vienna Convention’s change mechanisms
are public and explicit, and, therefore, easy to detect and examine. 55 But an
exclusive focus on the Vienna Convention assumes that change only occurs
according to its rules—an assumption that does not bear out in reality.

50. Campbell McLachlan, The Evolution of Treaty Obligations in International Law, in TREAsupra note 10, at 69, 71 (“It has been estimated that the number
of treaties more than tripled from 1970 to 1997.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing
from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (2010) (“There has . . . been a proliferation of
treaties, both in quantity and range of subject matter, especially after the establishment of the United
Nations system at the end of World War II.”); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1625 (2011) (“Treaties have proliferated . . . .”).
51. U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 366 (arguing that the International Law Commission
should revisit the subject of treaty evolution over time because “[p]roblems arise frequently in this
context”); Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law,
49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 353 (2008) (arguing that the stability of multilateral treaties “is at once a
curse and a blessing” because “adaptation to reflect changing circumstances, new scientific data, or
technological advances” is “exceptionally difficult”); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International
Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 76, 89 (2007) (lamenting that
“[t]reaties can often seem anachronistic as the world changes around them” because “once ratified,
it becomes very difficult to change the rules”).
52. Message to the Senate Transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, PUB.
PAPERS 1131 (Nov. 22, 1971).
53. The Convention was drafted over the course of two decades to codify already existing
customary international law. Aspects of the Convention have been recognized as customary international law by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) as well as countries that are not state
parties, such as the United States. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (noting that the United
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention but considers “many of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention . . . to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties”).
54. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 5–6 (2d ed. 2015).
55. The Vienna Convention’s change mechanisms involving treaty interpretation can be more
difficult to detect. Research on treaty interpretation relies heavily on the written opinions of international adjudicatory bodies, which are—again—readily accessible, yet only capable of providing
a partial picture of the interpretation that is occurring.
TIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE,
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This Part examines the change mechanisms within the Vienna Convention. I look first at a set of rules for formation, amendment, and abrogation.
I then turn to a set of rules for interpretation that have been the subject of
scholarly and doctrinal debate. Finally, I discuss why the Convention’s doctrinal rules are insufficient for developing an overarching understanding of
how treaties change and suggest a broader set of questions as a starting point
for that task.
A. Treaty Formation, Amendment, and Abrogation
The bulk of the provisions contained in the Vienna Convention specify
rules for change at three critical junctures in the lifecycle of a treaty: formation, 56 amendment, 57 and abrogation. 58 For a change to occur under these
rules, certain procedures must be followed and formalities must be met.
With respect to formation, the Convention dictates that every state possesses the “capacity to conclude treaties.” 59 A treaty is typically adopted by
the consent of all negotiating states 60 and enters into force according to provisions within the agreement. 61 Consent to be bound can be expressed in a
number of ways 62 by a range of state representatives, 63 and states may unilaterally exclude or modify certain provisions through reservations. 64
Once adopted and entered into force, a treaty can be amended by agreement between the parties according to the same rules that applied to the
treaty’s initial formation or by different rules set out within the treaty. 65 Under the Convention’s default rules, to amend a multilateral treaty as between
all the parties, every contracting party must be notified of the proposal for

56. Part II of the Vienna Convention governs the conclusion and entry into force of treaties.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6–25.
57. Part IV of the Vienna Convention governs the amendment and modification of treaties.
See id. arts. 39–41.
58. Part V of the Vienna Convention governs the invalidity, termination, and suspension of the
operation of treaties. See id. arts. 42–72.
59. Id. art. 6.
60. Id. art. 9. If adopted at an international conference, a vote of two-thirds of the states present
and voting is needed unless the same majority opts for a different rule. Id.
61. Id. art. 24. If there is no relevant provision or agreement, then a treaty enters into force as
soon as consent to be bound is established for all negotiating states. Id.
62. Id. art. 12 (detailing state consent by signature); id. art. 13 (detailing state consent by exchange of instruments constituting a treaty); id. art. 14 (detailing state consent by ratification, acceptance, or approval); id. art. 15 (detailing state consent by accession).
63. Id. arts. 7, 8.
64. Id. art. 19 (detailing formulation of reservations by states); id. art. 20 (detailing acceptance
of reservations); id. art. 21 (detailing the legal effect of reservations); id. art. 22 (detailing the withdrawal of reservations).
65. Id. art. 39.
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amendment and be allowed to take part in the negotiation or decision process. 66 A multilateral treaty can also be amended as to some of the parties
only. 67 And specific treaties may set out more streamlined formal mechanisms for adopting change, for instance through technical annexes or protocols. 68
A treaty’s obligations can be subsequently abrogated. 69 The agreement
can be void due to defects in consent. 70 It can be terminated, suspended, or
withdrawn from according to treaty provisions or with the consent of all parties to the agreement. 71 The treaty can be voided, terminated, suspended, or
withdrawn from due to a conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law, 72 conflict with a later treaty on the same subject matter, 73 material
breach by one of the parties, 74 supervening impossibility of performance, 75
or a “fundamental change of circumstances” unforeseen by the parties.76
In practice, these mechanisms of change are easy to detect but difficult
to employ. Amendment is possible, but the standard mechanism for altering
the text of a treaty “can quickly become an unachievable negotiating goal.” 77

66. Id. art. 40.
67. Id. art. 41.
68. See Boockmann & Thurner, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that “many treaties contain their
own rules by which amendments are facilitated” and that “diversity of amendment rules is high”).
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 42.
70. Id. arts. 48–52.
71. Id. arts. 54, 56–58.
72. Id. art. 53. A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law at the time of its conclusion. Id. It is terminated if it conflicts with a new peremptory norm that
later emerges. Id. art. 64.
73. Id. art. 59. Such termination occurs if all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to
the later treaty and if it appears or is established that the parties intended for the later treaty to prevail
or if the two treaties are so incompatible that they cannot be simultaneously applied. Id. art. 59(1).
The earlier treaty is considered only suspended if it appears or is established that the parties so
intended. Id. art. 59(2).
74. Id. art. 60. The non-breaching party can invoke the breach as a ground for termination or
suspension. Id. art. 60(1). A material breach is a “repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the
[Vienna Convention]” or the “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of the treaty.” Id. art. 60(3). The requirements are somewhat different for bilateral
treaties than multilateral treaties. Id. art. 60.
75. Id. art. 61. Termination or withdrawal is permitted where “the impossibility results from
the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the
treaty.” Id. Suspension is permitted if the impossibility is temporary. Id.
76. Id. art. 62. Termination or withdrawal is permitted where the changed circumstances both
were “an essential basis of the consent of the parties” and “radically . . . transform[ed] the extent of
obligations still be performed.” Id.
77. McLachlan, supra note 50, at 71; see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 197 (2006) (“[N]egotiation of a new rule to
supplant the old rule is possible, but there is no guarantee that such negotiations would end successfully (especially in cases of multilateral negotiations where consensus is difficult to achieve) . . . .”);
Crootof, supra note 10, at 239 (“Formal amendment and treaty supersession require states parties’
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This dilemma is particularly so for large-scale multilateral agreements that
require the consent of many parties. There are numerous examples of failed
attempts to update major treaties, even when streamlined formal amendment
processes are built into the agreement, including the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Covered Agreements, protocols under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and protocols under the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons.
Treaty termination occurs at an infrequent though steady rate.78 The
remaining provisions for abrogation are limited to extreme circumstances
that seldom arise. The provision on conflict with a later treaty only comes
into play when it is apparent that the parties intended for the later treaty to
prevail, or when the two treaties are “so far incompatible” that they cannot
be simultaneously applied. 79 Peremptory norms of international law are few
and far between, covering only the strongest and most universal norms, such
as the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. 80 Material breach, impossibility of performance, and fundamental change of circumstances are cast
in similarly restrictive terms. 81 The latter doctrine has never been successfully asserted in a judicial context, nor is there a clear example of it succeeding in a diplomatic context. 82
B. Treaty Interpretation
The difficulty of attaining change through the Convention’s provisions
on formation, amendment, and abrogation has led to greater attention being
paid to the Convention’s rules on interpretation. Exactly how much flexibility can be afforded by the interpretive rules has been contested in recent
years. 83 In particular, the prevalence of changes in informal implementation

explicit and unanimous consent, which will often be politically or practically infeasible to achieve
in multilateral treaty regimes.”).
78. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1606 (2005) (noting that 1547
denunciations and withdrawals from all multilateral treaties are registered with the United Nations
(“UN”) from 1945 to 2004, meaning that 3.5% of multilateral agreements concluded after 1945
have been denounced at least once).
79. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 59.
80. See id. art. 64. A peremptory norm of general international law is “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of [s]tates as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.” Id. art. 53.
81. See supra notes 74–76; see also Nolte, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that mechanisms such
as supervening impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances are “rarely
used”).
82. Helfer, supra note 78, at 1643; see also Cohen, supra note 51, at 90 n.94 (noting examples
of the ICJ rejecting the invocation of fundamental change of circumstances).
83. See, e.g., GARDINER, supra note 54; ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION
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on the ground in the absence of explicit changes to the treaty itself has led to
much scholarly writing on a provision that allows subsequent practice to fold
back into treaty interpretation. 84 That scholarship primarily examines the
published written opinions of prominent international adjudicatory bodies,
some of which have applied the provision to accommodate more change than
others.
The Vienna Convention stipulates that a treaty must be interpreted in
good faith, according to the ordinary and contextual meaning of its terms,
and in light of its object and purpose. 85 Interpretation must take into account
any “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions,” any “subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation,” and any “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 86 There is no hierarchy among
these interpretive principles. They must all be “thrown into the crucible” and
carried out as a “single combined operation.” 87
How these interpretive rules contend with the passing of time has been
the subject of debate. 88 One question is whether the “ordinary meaning” of
terms ought to be pegged to their usage at the time the agreement was made
(referred to as the principle of contemporaneity89), or if they can shift to re-

ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2007); PANOS MERKOURIS, ARTICLE 31(3)(C) VCLT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: NORMATIVE SHADOWS IN PLATO’S CAVE (2015); Donald H. Re-

gan, Sources of International Trade Law: Understanding What the Vienna Convention Says About
Identifying and Using “Sources for Treaty Interpretation,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1047 (Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2017);
TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS
ON (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010).
84. See, e.g., BUGA, supra note 15; TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10;
U.N. A/73/10, supra note 15, at 11–116; U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 365–89.
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31. Context can be gleamed from sources such as
the treaty’s preamble and annexes. Id.
86. Id.
87. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: Documents of the Conference,
at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 (1971) (“All the various elements, as they were present in
any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.”); see also Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
and Arbitral Tribunals of Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Relating to Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent
Practice, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 169, 171.
88. See Nolte, supra note 87, at 172 (explaining that while working on “the Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties the [International Law] Commission discussed this question of treaty interpretation ‘over time’” but “found that ‘to attempt to formulate a rule covering comprehensively the
temporal element would present difficulties’”).
89. Even more specifically, scholars debate whether the principle of contemporaneity requires
a reference to language usage at the time a treaty was negotiated, concluded, or entered into force.
See GARDINER, supra note 54, at 292–93; MERKOURIS, supra note 83, at 120–22.
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flect their usage at the time of application (“evolutive” or “dynamic” interpretation 90). Other points of controversy are how to deal with “rules of international law applicable . . . between the parties” that come into existence at
a later point in time, 91 how to identify and incorporate subsequent agreements
on interpretation, 92 and how to establish and treat agreements on interpretation based on subsequent practice. The latter question has been the most divisive.
The language of the provision—requiring that treaties be interpreted
within the context of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”—
indicates that subsequent practice can be invoked as evidence of an agreement between the parties regarding the treaty’s interpretation. 93 Such agreement is most clearly demonstrated when the parties to an agreement engage
in common and consistent conduct in application of that agreement. 94 Not

90. See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213, ¶¶ 64, 66 (July 13) (applying an evolutive interpretive approach); Iron
Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 73 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (finding that “an evolutive
interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of
its object and purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule”); see also
GARDINER, supra note 54, at 469 (discussing evolutive interpretation); Nolte, supra note 16, at 2
(discussing evolutive interpretation).
91. See, e.g., Iron Rhine Railway, 27 R.I.A.A. at 66 (taking into account treaty obligations
subsequently concluded between the parties).
92. “Subsequent agreements” refer to recorded agreements on interpretation, “rang[ing] from
formal to almost ephemeral,” though not as formal as the treaty itself. GARDINER, supra note 54,
at 225; see also Luigi Crema, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice Within and Outside
the Vienna Convention, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 13, 25 (discussing non-binding memoranda of understandings as an example of a subsequent agreement);
Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence Under Special Regimes Relating to Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 210, 303 (concluding
that “adjudicatory bodies have rarely relied on subsequent agreements in the sense of Article
31(3)(a) VCLT”).
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(3)(b); U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 371 (stating that invocation of subsequent practice should be “limited to elucidating the actual and continuing
agreement of parties”); see also Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 289, 293 (2013);
Rahim Moloo, When Actions Speak Louder than Words: The Relevance of Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2013).
94. See GARDINER, supra note 54, at 259 (“[P]ractice requires an element of constancy, a feature which is reinforced by the context in that subsequent practice must be sufficient to reveal the
agreement of the parties on interpretation.”); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 137 (2d ed. 1984) (“A practice is a sequence of facts or acts and cannot in general
be established by one isolated fact or act or even by several individual applications.”); Arato, supra
note 93, at 293 (“Because the goal is establishing the extent of the parties’ mutual consent to be
bound by an agreement, an authentic practice must entail the consistent practice of all of the parties.”).
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all parties need to actively engage in the conduct, but the non-engaging parties must acquiesce in the concordant practice of others. 95 Beyond these general tenets, there is much disagreement on what counts as subsequent practice; how specific, clear, and consistent a practice needs to be to establish
agreement; whose application beyond those of state parties matters; and how
explicitly related practice must be to a treaty to quality as practice in its application. 96
Analysis of subsequent practice focuses predominantly on written adjudicatory opinions, 97 which have employed the provision in conflicting ways.
The WTO’s adjudicatory bodies, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and
the tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) have taken narrow, restrained approaches. 98 They tend to
place the burden of proof on the party appealing to subsequent practice and
require a robust showing of common and consistent conduct. 99 The WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body (“WTO DSB”) demands that the subsequent practice reflect “the considered view of the parties to the treaty,” imposes a high
threshold for inferring acquiescence from silence, and disregards practice that
is contradicted or opposed by other parties. 100
By contrast, other adjudicatory bodies have been more eager to accommodate change. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has based treaty
interpretation not only on the subsequent practice of parties, but also on the
subsequent practice of United Nations (“UN”) bodies and organs. 101 The
ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict considered institutional practice without tying it to an
95. GARDINER, supra note 54, at 254 (“[T]o amount to an ‘authentic interpretation,’ the practice must be such as to indicate that the interpretation has received the tacit assent of the parties
generally.”); MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES 431 (2009) (confirming that this provision requires the active practice of only some
of the parties); Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of
Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 443, 460 (2010) (noting the perennial problem of identifying such acquiescence).
96. See BUGA, supra note 15, at 23–75 (discussing complexities in each of these elements);
U.N. A/73/10, supra note 15, at 11–116 (laying out the International Law Commission’s most recent
conclusions on some of these questions).
97. DJEFFAL, supra note 10, at 5 (“The research on interpretative practice is limited to the
practice of international courts.”); GARDINER, supra note 54, at 12 (“[I]t seems likely that the accounts of the practice of many international courts and tribunals may prove to be the most helpful
guide to understanding the Vienna rules and to their use in connection with new issues of interpretation that arise.”); Nolte, supra note 87, at 170 (“The jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice and that of arbitral tribunals of ad hoc jurisdiction are the traditional authoritative sources
for the elucidation of the legal effects of subsequent agreement and practice.”).
98. Nolte, supra note 92, at 303–05 (noting that WTO DSB and ICSID tribunals establish a
significant burden of proof for the side invoking subsequent practice); Arato, supra note 93, at 294.
99. Nolte, supra note 92, at 304–05.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
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agreement among state parties or even full awareness of that practice among
state parties. 102 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
has examined “social practice” and the practice of private and organizational
actors in implementing human rights treaties. 103 The ECHR does not require
full consensus, treating the subsequent practice of a “vast majority” of state
actors or a “near consensus” as sufficient for influencing interpretation, even
when that practice is contradicted. 104
Subsequent practice has even been employed to support a treaty interpretation that strains or contradicts the plain meaning of the text. The result
is a functional treaty “modification”—a term used by the UN’s International
Law Commission to denote “where the parties by common consent in fact
apply the treaty in a manner which its provisions do not envisage,” 105 thereby
circumventing the formal procedures for amendment. 106 The ICJ employed
subsequent practice in this way in two of its advisory opinions based on institutional practices: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall”) and Legal Consequences for State
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (“Namibia”). 107 In Namibia, the ICJ examined Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which requires that
non-procedural decisions of the Security Council 108 be made “by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent

102. Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 66, ¶ 27 (July 8) (considering resolutions of the WHO’s Health Assembly, a report of
the Director-General, and a report of the Management Group as evidence of practice). But see
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶ 74 (Dec. 13) (taking
a more literal and strict approach to subsequent practice).
103. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Subsequent Practice, Practices, and ‘Family-Resemblance’: Towards Embedding Subsequent Practice in its Operative Milieu, in TREATIES AND
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 53.
104. See Nolte, supra note 92, at 304–05; Arato, supra note 93, at 295.
105. Arato, supra note 93, at 310 (quoting Rec. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 18th Sess., May 4–
July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, at 236 (1966)).
106. C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 54–55 (2d rev. ed. 2005); GARDINER, supra note 54, at 243–45; Arato, supra note
93, at 309.
107. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 27 (July 9); Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June 21).
108. The Security Council is the body of the UN tasked with “maintaining international peace
and security.” What is the Security Council?, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council (last visited May 10, 2019). It
has fifteen members, five of which are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) and ten of which are rotating. Current Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members (last visited May 10,
2019).
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members.” 109 Against this textual backdrop, the ICJ concluded that “concurring votes” includes abstentions based on a “general practice” as evidenced
by “the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period.” 110
In Wall, the ICJ held that Article 12(1) of the UN Charter forbidding the
General Assembly from making recommendations on matters that are being
dealt with by the Security Council nonetheless permitted such concurrent effort because it was the “accepted practice of the General Assembly, as it ha[d]
evolved.” 111 Additionally, both the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have recognized
that subsequent practice can alter precisely drawn national boundaries.112
These expansive uses of subsequent practice by international courts and
tribunals have generated criticism by some scholars, who warn that courts
and tribunals have stretched this interpretive rule “to the point that its letter
is disregarded.” 113 Decisions at times reference subsequent practice generically without citing to the Vienna Convention 114 or pay “no more than lip
service” 115 to the relevant provision, suggesting that adjudicators are unfamiliar with the Vienna Convention rules or invoke them opportunistically. 116
Properly understood, the requisite degree of consistent practice should be difficult to establish and the scope of change achievable limited by a good faith
reading of the ordinary meaning of treaty text. 117 Moreover, a provision that
109. Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 21; see also id. ¶ 22 (noting in particular
that such a general practice was demonstrated by “presidential rulings and the positions taken by
members of the Council, in particular its permanent members,” who had “consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member . . . [as having] been
generally accepted by Members of the United Nations”).
110. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
111. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. Rep ¶ 28.
112. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgement, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 23–
36 (June 15); Location of Boundary Markers in Taba Between Egypt and Israel, 20 R.I.A.A. 3, ¶
210 (Egyptian-Israeli Joint Comm’n 1988); Decision Regarding Delimitation of Border between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, 25 R.I.A.A. 85, ¶¶ 3.8–3.10 (Eri.-Eth. Boundary Comm’n 2002).
113. Nolte, supra note 16, at 19; see also Crema, supra note 92, at 26–27 (arguing that subsequent practice has been used and applied by international courts and tribunals considerably beyond
what the Vienna Convention allows); Marcelo G. Kohen, Keeping Subsequent Agreements and
Practice in Their Right Limits, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 34, 34
(“There is a temptation to include all sorts of acts performed by parties to the treaty and non-parties
alike under the umbrella of ‘subsequent practice.’”).
114. See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 46 (Dec. 19); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 275, ¶¶ 61–66 (June 11);
Maritime Delimitation in Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993
I.C.J. Rep. 38, ¶ 28 (June 14) (discussing subsequent practice generically while referencing practices, including other international treaties on similar issues).
115. GARDINER, supra note 54, at 8.
116. Id. at 8; Crema, supra note 92, at 27.
117. See McLachlan, supra note 50, at 71 (noting that “the scale of state participation in the
great multilateral treaties can also make it practically impossible to establish from the conduct of
the states parties themselves the requisite degree of consistent ‘subsequent practice’”); Moloo, supra
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would have allowed treaties to “be modified . . . by . . . subsequent practice . . . in [its] application” was removed from an earlier draft of the Vienna
Convention, 118 though the significance of that removal is debated.119
Other scholars justify the liberal use of subsequent practice as a necessary source of flexibility for updating stagnant treaties and for closing gaps
between treaty prescriptions and the reality on the ground. 120 A few scholars
have even pushed for a doctrinal change that would give subsequent practice
a more prominent role in the law of treaties. Harlan Grant Cohen advocates
an approach that focuses on the “processes by which rules come to be internalized by international actors . . . [r]ather than taking for granted that a treaty
reflects international law.” 121 Rebecca Crootof contends that treaties should
be modifiable by subsequently developed customary international law. 122
Beyond the readily accessible decisions of adjudicatory bodies, little is
known about the operation of subsequent practice. 123 Treaty interpretation
takes place far more frequently as part of their day-to-day application, 124 but
such routine interpretive decisions are poorly documented and often hidden
from view unless and until a dispute leads to a legal proceeding before an

note 93, at 87–88 (“The parties’ agreement as to the meaning of the treaty text, however, must still
be consistent with the ordinary meaning, read in good faith, in context, and in line with its object
and purpose.”).
118. DJEFFAL, supra note 10, at 42.
119. See BUGA, supra note 15, at 363 (explaining that the draft article was deleted for reasons
unrelated to whether it reflected the current state of international law, namely that it overlapped with
other Vienna Convention provisions and that it prompted questions too complex given time constraints).
120. See, e.g., id. at 192 (noting that “[t]he practical difficulty (even impossibility) often encountered with formal amendment, the premise of pacta sunt servanda, the fluid interchange between interpretation and modification, and the significance of the contemporaneous intention of the
parties . . . all reinforce the validity of and need for the process of treaty modification by subsequent
practice”); Cohen, supra note 51, at 85 (citing “the apparent gap growing between treaties and state
action and concerns about treaties’ relative inability to adapt quickly enough to a constantly changing world” as challenges); Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice for the Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra
note 10, at 82, 87 (“Treaties are cumbersome devices that cannot change quickly . . . . [W]e may
be entering a period when greater flexibility in treaty interpretation is needed.”).
121. Cohen, supra note 51, at 71.
122. Crootof, supra note 10, at 239–40.
123. GARDINER, supra note 54, at 12 (recognizing “treaty interpretation is not only undertaken
in disputes before courts and tribunals . . . but those instances outside case reports are not readily
accessed or assimilated into clear guidance”); Georg Nolte, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent
Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 307, 308 (noting the difficulty of describing and assessing subsequent practice in its immediate form due to the lack of published and clearly identifiable records).
124. GARDINER, supra note 54, at 124–25 (“[I]nternationally, issues over treaty interpretation
will commonly be a matter for discussion, negotiation, and agreement between states or for resolution with an international organization, with judicial or arbitral determination covering only a small
minority of cases.”).
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adjudicatory body. 125 Without descriptive studies into how treaties actually
change, little can be said about the overall role of subsequent practice and
whether it is properly deployed.
C. What is Missing?
Investigating the dynamism of treaties through the Vienna Convention
and formal change mechanisms—particularly when limited to easily accessible and publicly available evidence—generates a partial picture at best. This
is echoed by a smattering of largely unconnected observations across international law scholarship. Georg Nolte observes, “In most cases, the evolution of the context of a treaty must be accommodated by more informal
means.” 126 Harold Koh describes modern international law as “fluid and
messy,” functioning through “nontraditional efforts at legal diplomacy,” and
requiring analysis beyond treaty language and judicial decisions. 127 Janet
Koven Levit chronicles a process of “[b]ottom-up” lawmaking in international trade and finance, whereby “the very practitioners—both public and
private—who must roll up their sleeves and grapple with the day-to-day technicalities of their trade” are creating, interpreting, and enforcing rules based
on their experiences on the ground. 128 Laurence Helfer explores the institutional role played by the International Labor Organization in lawmaking activities over the course of its long history. 129 Each of these studies hint at
important developments beyond the Vienna Convention, the doctrinal meaning of subsequent practice, and the text and formal implementation of treaties. Instead, they call for attention to the complex, decentralized, and oftentimes opaque world of informal treaty implementation.
International law scholarship currently lacks tools for understanding
these informal implementation-level developments in their own right. Basic
conceptual and empirical questions have yet to be explored: What are the
“informal means” by which change is pursued? Who brings about this type
of change, under what conditions, and for what purpose? How prevalent is

125. U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 370 (noting that subsequent practice “is not always welldocumented and often only comes to light in legal proceedings”); BUGA, supra note 15, at 6 (noting
that “[e]xamples of subsequent practice have never been collected in any systematic way”); see also
Anthea Roberts, Subsequent Agreements and Practice: The Battle over Interpretive Power, in
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 95, 97 (observing that routine interpretive
decisions rarely give rise to disputes and are unlikely to do so precisely where subsequent practice
is consistent and thus a proper use of the interpretive rule).
126. Nolte, supra note 16, at 3.
127. Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO.
L.J. ONLINE 1, 14, 18 (2012).
128. Levit, supra note 32, at 126.
129. Helfer, supra note 32.
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this type of change, and what is its relationship to the more formal mechanisms of change within the Vienna Convention?
The next Part draws insights about the role of informal implementation
in the dynamism of domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions. Part III
presents a framework for understanding informal implementation dynamism
in treaties based on vignettes from the history of international infectious disease regulation.
II. INSIGHTS FROM DOMESTIC ANALOGUES
Treaties have been analogized to contracts 130 and statutes 131 and described as a type of institution. 132 In each area, using language particular to
each field, scholars have examined how change arises. This Part highlights
common themes in how the informal implementation of contracts, 133 statutes, 134 and institutions 135 contributes to their evolution over time. Although
not discussed in this Article, a similar strand of scholarship exists with respect to amending national constitutions. In particular, the difficulty of
changing the U.S. Constitution under Article V procedures has led to reliance
on more feasible, alternative change mechanisms such as by judicial decision-making or statute. 136
Scholarship on each analogue suggests that examining the everyday, informal dynamics of implementers on the ground reveals change not apparent
or foreseeable from the written covenant itself. Implementation change tends
to be slow-moving but can add up across time, leading not only to extensions
but also to contradictions of covenant language. Over the course of long130. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“What
is a treaty? The answer is, it is a compact formed between two nations or communities, having the
right of self government.”); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (“A treaty is in its nature a
contract between two nations, not a legislative act.”); see also Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 826
(2007); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits
of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 556 (2004).
131. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the Constitution a treaty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.”); see also
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 701 n.52 (1998)
(noting that “[t]reaties are of the same constitutional dignity as statutes”).
132. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401
(2000) (“‘Legalization’ refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not)
possess.”).
133. See infra Section II.A.
134. See infra Section II.B.
135. See infra Section II.C.
136. See e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution “would look the same today if Article
V of the Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal
amendment” because of reliance on more achievable means of change instead).
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term contracts or due to legislative inertia, informal implementation can stray
from the written covenant in unexpected ways and reveal information that
informs subsequent rewrites.
A. Contracts
During the 1980s, relational contract theorists such as Ian Macneil observed that contractual relationships are, in practice, more dynamic than previously considered. 137 They called into question earlier depictions of contracts as discrete, one-time, “spot” interactions between strangers, 138 introducing instead a “relational” model in which contracts govern repeat interactions over long periods of time between parties in ongoing relationships. 139
Due to the duration and complexity of “relational contracts,” 140 they typically
are not fully planned at the front-end and require greater flexibility at the
back-end. 141 Relational contract theorists, therefore, are less focused on the
single instant of contract formation and more attentive to the dynamic processes by which contractual relationships evolve over time: “[A] contract is
partly what it was at the time of contract formation and partly what it becomes
thereafter.” 142
A number of authors have noted similarities between relational contracts
and treaties that govern the repeat, long-term interactions between states. 143
As in the treaty context where scholars have sought greater flexibility in the
Vienna Convention’s interpretive rules, contract scholars too have pushed for
137. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and
Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000).
138. See Macneil, supra note 137, at 884; Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823 (2000).
139. Scholars disagree on which specific characteristics define a “relational contract.” See, e.g.,
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 814,
816 (2000) (defining a relational contract as one “that involves not merely an exchange, but also a
relationship, between the contracting parties” and noting that “the phrase ‘long-term contracts’ has
become virtually a synonym for relational contracts”). But see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (arguing that “[a] contract is
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement
to well-defined obligations.”).
140. Most agree that relational contracts are not a subset of contracts, but that all contracts are
relational to different degrees. See Macneil, supra note 137, at 896 (“[L]ike the ends of rainbows,
the ends of the relational/as-if-discrete spectrum are mythical.”).
141. Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at 1090–92; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 854, 865 (1978); see also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 862 (2000).
142. Eisenberg, supra note 139, at 810.
143. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 130, at 827; Jared Wessel, Relational Contract Theory and
Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v. Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
149, 150 (2004).
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more flexible rules on contract interpretation. 144 Some argue that courts
should consider a broader range of sources to divine the intention of the parties and be given wider latitude to adjust contracts after formation. They
could, for instance, rely on implied terms, such as covenants of good faith
and fair dealing, that require looking beyond the four corners of the agreement. 145 Others are skeptical that courts have the competence to understand
complex and evolving relationships between parties, and therefore advocate
a more passive judicial role. 146
In practice, the scholarship on relational contracts has had limited impact on judicial decision-making. 147 That limited impact might not be surprising since relational contract theory itself downplays the role of formal
adjudication. Resorting to legal sanctions can harm the underlying relationship, 148 while other sanctions of a political or social nature are available in
the context of continuing interdependence. 149 Stewart Macaulay’s empirical
work suggests that lawsuits are rarely brought for breaches of contract. 150
Instead, adjustments are made and disputes resolved in ways unforeseen by
the contract, or in outright contradiction of the contract, as part of the “giveand-take” needed to maintain business relations. 151 This process of ongoing
adaptation is “administrative” and can lead to “glacial[]” change through the
accumulation of “small-scale, day-to-day adjustments.” 152
Not only can contracts change in unexpected ways as gaps emerge
between party behavior and the terms of the written agreement, but they are

144. See Eisenberg, supra note 139; Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000).
145. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215–16 (1994) (arguing that courts should,
under some circumstances, resolve contractual disputes by applying prevailing commercial customs); Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at 1091, 1114 (arguing that courts should fill the gaps in
relational contracts with whichever terms would maximize the value of the contractual relationship);
Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW.
U. L. REV. 369, 404–05 (1981); Speidel, supra note 138, at 836 (arguing for a more sophisticated
duty of good faith).
146. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 144, at 754; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 274
(1992).
147. Speidel, supra note 138, at 824. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
202(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
148. Wessel, supra note 143, at 155.
149. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (1985)
(discussing “relational sanctions”).
150. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 61, 65 (1963) (suggesting that the written contract is not as important or may serve
other purposes such as “a communication device within a large corporation”).
151. Id. at 61.
152. Macneil, supra note 141, at 895, 901.
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rarely formulated from a blank slate in the first place. 153 Over time, contracts
may be renegotiated to incorporate adjustments made and information gathered through the process of translating contracts into reality. Scholars studying the evolution of supply-chain contracts propose a cyclical model in
which: (1) parties make contractual commitments based on limited information and cognitive shortcomings; (2) parties engage in a process of dynamic learning over the duration of the contract as they develop knowledge
about operations, relationship management, and respective strengths and
weaknesses; and (3) parties renegotiate their contractual relationship based
on their dynamic learning. 154 A longitudinal case study of the contractual
relationship between a Norwegian railway and its catering service provider
concludes that contractual relationships are dynamic and that the parties’
ability to manage the evolutionary process is critical to achieving long-term
benefits. 155
B. Statutes
Since the 1980s, scholars such as William Eskridge, Ronald Dworkin,
Alexander Aleinikoff, and Daniel Farber have argued that statutory interpretation “is, and should be, dynamic,” rather than moored to the enacting Congress’ historical intent. 156 They use the term “interpretation” broadly, examining all players involved in the translation of statutes into reality. Understood in this way, “interpretation” is similar to how I use the term “implementation,” as explained in Part III.
Eskridge posits that statutory interpretation is “multifaceted and evolutive.” 157 The exercise of statutory interpretation is not an archaeological
quest to discover historical meaning. It is a creative enterprise to assign current meaning to a text that omits politically unresolved issues, overlooks unanticipated issues, and encounters resistance in its integration into society. 158
It is multifaceted in that it involves many actors, each with their own values
and visions. Interpretation shifts whenever the interpreter’s perspective differs from that of the statute. 159

153. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013)
(describing contract production as “path-dependent,” as drafters “take existing products and try to
improve them so that they can meet the clients’ needs at hand”).
154. Tim Coltman et al., Supply Chain Contract Evolution, 27 EUR. MGMT. J. 388, 390–91
(2009).
155. Id. at 392, 398.
156. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 390 & n.178 (1991).
157. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48 (1994).
158. Id. at 51; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1482, 1498 (1987).
159. ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 11, 49.
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Matthew Christiansen and Eskridge describe statutory interpretation as
a “dynamic game” that is sequential, hierarchical, and ongoing over time. 160
Each interpreter occupies a “strategic position” and must anticipate and respond to the preferences of others. 161 Interpretation begins at the “retail
level” with those at whom the statute is directed: private citizens, communities of interpretation, interest groups, low-level bureaucrats in administrative
agencies, and other ground-level implementers. 162 These front-line interpreters are the most sensitive to changing circumstances, needs, and ideas. Retail
interpretations then work their way to the “wholesalers”: agency heads and
the Supreme Court. 163 Finally, the sitting Congress can override the Supreme
Court’s interpretation with new legislation that restores what it considers to
be the correct interpretation or that updates outdated statutory schemes with
new policies. 164 The cycle then begins anew. Interpretation, therefore, occurs “everywhere all the time, with no one interpreter having the final word
on what a statute means.” 165
Administrative agencies are particularly well-positioned to drive change
in this dynamic and cyclical game. 166 At the outset, agencies lobby for and
help draft legislation, or at least testify on the subject during legislative hearings. 167 Most statutes, in turn, are delegations to agencies, 168 making them
responsible for rulemaking and enforcement as well as the bulk of adjudication. 169 In each of these functions, agencies tend to be responsive to changing
circumstances and patterns of violations due to their ground-level involvement in implementation. There are many examples of agencies drastically

160. Eskridge, supra note 156, at 334; Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1317 (2014).
161. See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263, 276 (1992); see also Eskridge, supra note 156, at 334.
162. ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 69; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1372; Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 161, at 263.
163. ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 69.
164. Id. at 11, 49; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1320.
165. ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 70.
166. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1321.
167. See Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, in 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, art. 2, at 4 (2002); Lisa
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN L. REV. 725, 767 (2014).
168. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 551 (1985).
169. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, in 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 167, art. 9, at 9; Rubin, supra note 167, at 2.
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updating policies without statutory basis or judicial rebuke over the last few
decades. 170
Statutory interpretation is particularly dynamic when the statute is old
and the original assumptions and expectations underlying the policy have
been overtaken by later developments. This lapse in time—usually due to
legislative inertia—is doubly significant because new information emerges
over time, leading to learning and potentially altered policy preferences on
the part of various interpreters. 171 The degree of elasticity in statutory meaning can be extremely broad: Statutes can evolve not only beyond their language and original legislative intent but also against them. 172 Such evolution
and learning can, in turn, inform subsequent legislative overrides, whether
for the purpose of restoring or updating.
C. Institutions
Political scientists and sociologists have theorized about the genesis and
evolution of domestic legal and political institutions. 173 “Institution” is defined as formalized obligatory rules, typically involving rights and obligations that “may be enforced by calling upon a third party.” 174 Prior scholarship on punctuated equilibrium and path dependence drew a sharp distinction
between the sudden innovation and upheaval that occurs when institutions
are created, radically reorganized, or dismantled and the prolonged periods
of relative stability in between. 175 More recently, authors such as Kathleen
Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck have argued that such frameworks overlook

170. See, e.g., Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1478 (discussing examples of regulatory agencies that have radically changed regulatory policies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Patent Office).
171. Eskridge, supra note 156, at 379.
172. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 282 (1989).
173. See e.g., JAMES MAHONEY & KATHLEEN THELEN, EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER (2010); KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN (2004);
T.J. PEMPEL, REGIME SHIFT: COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS OF THE JAPANESE POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1998); BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES
(Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005).
174. Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advance Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY, supra note 173, at 1, 10. “Institution” is distinguished
from informal norms such as mores and customs, and from voluntary social interactions in which
breach of an expectation leads only to strategic responses by those affected. Id. at 9–12.
175. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. POL.
STUD. 66, 77–80 (1988) (discussing the punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change); Ann
Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 273, 278–82 (1986) (drawing
a distinction between “unsettled” times when social transformation and new cultural complexes are
possible and “settled” times).
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gradual yet significant institutional developments.176 They set out to rethink
what constitutes change and how it can be detected in the absence of overt
disruption to formalized rules.
Historical studies of key domestic institutions governing the political
economies of select countries reveal that immense transformations can result
from gradual, incremental adjustments to the implementation of the very institutions that are being reformed or dissolved. 177 This gradual change originates from the normal yet contested “everyday implementation and enactment of an institution.” 178 Rules are put into action by an array of actors with
divergent interests engaged in an ongoing struggle to shape the rules’ meaning. 179 Some of these actors are rule-makers who set the rules; others are
rule-takers who are expected to comply with obligations. 180 Some may favor
a sincere application of the rule in good will; others may try to revise or circumvent the rule in the process of implementation. The sum of their interactions gives rise to a “continuous probing of the boundary between the legal
and the illegal” as new interpretations are invented and tested. 181 No single
actor controls this process, which can open an unpredictable gap between the
institution as designed by its creators and the actual behavior put in motion
underneath it. Over time, the gap may widen with far-reaching implications. 182
Because this type of change occurs through the mechanics of an institution’s everyday implementation, complications arising from that process—
problems with interpretation, implementation, enforcement, and compliance—are windows of opportunity for change. These everyday problems
uncover ambiguities and open up space for existing rules to be administered
or extended in novel ways. 183 Change often results from skirmishing, as implementers with different preferences struggle to resolve implementation
problems in their own favor.
176. See MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 4; THELEN, supra note 173; Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 8–9.
177. Their case studies focus predominantly on wealthy, Western democracies such as the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan. For example, they examine the transformation of national institutions during the 1980s and 1990s to become increasingly capitalist.
Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 2–4.
178. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
179. See Jack Knight, Explaining the Rise of Neoliberalism: The Mechanisms of Institutional
Change, in THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 20 (John L. Campbell &
Ove K. Pedersen eds., 1999) (describing institutional development as “a contest among actors to
establish rules which structure outcomes to those equilibria most favorable to them”).
180. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 13.
181. Id. at 15.
182. Id. at 8; PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 13 (2004) (“Some causal processes and outcomes occur slowly because they are incremental—
it simply takes a long time for them to add up to anything.”).
183. MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 4.
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Gradual change of this kind tends to be subtler and may be difficult to
detect until it becomes fully apparent in hindsight. This delayed effect calls
for longitudinal studies tracing, over time, the contestation between various
actors to implement rules in their preferred way. Based on such studies,
scholars propose that there are a handful of analytically distinct modes of
gradual institutional change. 184 I do not discuss them here, but I draw on
them below in examining the strategies for implementation dynamism. 185
III. INFORMAL IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMISM
Having highlighted some common themes in how the everyday implementation of domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions contributes to their
evolution over time, I return to the subject of treaties. This Part shines a
spotlight on what I call “informal implementation dynamism”: change that
stems from the ongoing, everyday process of implementing a treaty on the
ground. I understand implementation to encompass all the events and activities mobilized in translating a treaty into action186—including some measure
of interpretation to give meaning to treaty text. Implementers are all the actors who have a hand in or wield influence over these events and activities. I
focus on informal implementation dynamism, meaning changes in practice
that are not accompanied by official change under the rules of the Vienna
Convention or the rules of the treaty at issue, or official acts of implementation by state parties. 187
184. See id. at 15–18; Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 18–30.
185. See infra Section III.C.
186. This definition follows that of other prominent authors writing about implementation. See
David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 4 (David G.
Victor et al. eds., 1998) (defining implementation as “the process by which ‘intent gets translated
into action’” and “those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public
policy directives, which include the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and
events” (first quoting Martin Rein & Francine Rabinowitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective, in AMERICAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 308 (Walter Dean Burnham & Martha Wagner
Weinberg eds., 1987); and then quoting DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & PAUL A. SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983))).
187. My usage of the term “informal” is similar to Laurence Helfer’s usage. Helfer distinguishes “formal” flexibility mechanisms, such as reservations, escape clauses, and withdrawal provisions that are “incorporate[ed] . . . into . . . multilateral and bilateral agreements,” from “informal”
flexibility mechanisms, such as de facto modifications through conduct, auto-interpretation, and
withholding of financial support. Helfer, supra note 12, at 176, 177. By contrast, other scholars
use “informal” to characterize the form of an international agreement, the process by which it was
reached, or the actors involved. The form of the agreement can range from an intricate written
document to an exchange of notes, a joint communiqué, an oral or tacit bargain, or a norm. The
process can range from the elaborate procedures of a traditional intergovernmental organization and
domestic procedures for consent and ratification to those employed by a loosely organized network.
The actors involved can range from those typically involved in diplomacy (heads of state, foreign
ministries, and embassies) to other branches, lower level bureaucracies, or sub-federal entities. See,
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The process of implementing a treaty on the ground is akin to a strategic
game that takes place over time, as implementers—including those unsatisfied with the treaty as negotiated—jostle to implement the treaty according
to their own preferences. I map the range of implementers engaged in this
game—including countries, international organizations, and epistemic communities—and highlight the importance of looking inside institutions and bureaucracies to understand how front-line decisions about informal implementation are made. I characterize three key strategies implementers might pursue to drive or forestall change: (1) converting the treaty from within through
altered practice; (2) eroding the treaty through neglect or actively resisting
adaptation in the face of drifting circumstances; and (3) shifting to another
institutional option to solve the underlying problem.
Relying on insights from domestic analogues and vignettes from the history of international infectious disease regulation, I argue that informal implementation dynamism is important, yet easily overlooked. It is important
because informal change via implementation can be a more accessible alternative to the formal avenues of change set out in the Vienna Convention or
in the treaty itself. Its impact over time can be transformative both on the
ground and as a precursor to revision of the treaty at a later time. It is easily
overlooked because it is often subtler in form, smaller in scale, and its documentation less publicly available. Informal implementation dynamism may
be difficult to detect as it is occurring, and its influence may not be evident
except in hindsight.
I develop and illustrate this Part through historical examples from the
international regulation of infectious disease—an area that is exceptional in
some ways, but illustrates clearly patterns that have been observed elsewhere
as well. 188 In an effort to control the cross-border spread of epidemics while
limiting interference with international trade and traffic, states convened conferences and concluded a series of conventions beginning in the nineteenth
century. Those conferences and conventions eventually led to the formation
of the first international health organization in 1907, 189 which was absorbed
into the WHO at its establishment following World War II in 1948. The
earlier conventions were consolidated, renamed, and updated under the
WHO’s auspices. Infectious disease is thus one of the oldest continuous areas of international regulation, persisting to this day.

e.g., Joost Pauwelyn et al., An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 1, 3 (Joost Pauwelyn et al. eds., 2012); Charles Lipson, Why are
Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L. ORG. 495, 495–501 (1991).
188. See infra Part IV.
189. The International Office of Public Hygiene (Office International d’Hygiène Publique) was
founded in Paris for the purpose of overseeing the then-existing conventions on infectious disease
regulation. See GOODMAN, supra note 17.
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The particular examples I discuss deal with the emergence and recent
evolution of the now-in-force 2005 IHR. One of the most widely subscribed
to instruments of international law, 190 the 2005 IHR came into effect for most
state parties in 2007 191 and governed recent high-profile outbreaks such as
Ebola and Zika. Although called a revision, the 2005 IHR is widely considered “[a] revolution in the governance of global infectious disease.” 192 It not
only updated the prior 1969 IHR but also introduced an entirely new approach to infectious disease control.
The old “barrier approach” under the 1969 IHR 193 covered only a handful of specific infectious diseases, 194 while relying solely on self-reporting by
state parties to track epidemics. 195 The overall objective was to prevent the
movement of the covered diseases across national borders. By contrast, the
“epidemiological approach” under the 2005 IHR covers “all events which
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.” 196 The
epidemiological approach establishes a broader and more active surveillance
system managed by the WHO 197 that relies heavily on internet surveillance
tools. 198 The overall objective is the rapid detection and swift control of epidemics at their source with unprecedented requirements for state parties to
develop their internal public health capacities.199
On the surface, examined through the lens of formal change mechanisms, the transformation from the 1969 IHR to the 2005 IHR began in 1995

190. The 2005 IHR currently has 196 state parties. States Parties to the International Health
Regulations (2005), WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
191. Id.
192. Fidler, supra note 20, at 799.
193. While the details changed over time, the barrier approach persisted from the beginning of
international infectious disease cooperation in the mid-nineteenth century until the 1969 IHR. It
extended across numerous agreements and several international health institutions, culminating in
the 1969 IHR under the WHO’s auspices. Wang, supra note 28, at 17.
194. “The specific diseases covered varied over time” and at different points “included cholera,
plague, yellow fever, typhus, relapsing fever, and smallpox.” Id. Prior to the adoption of the 2005
IHR, the 1969 IHR covered cholera, plague, and yellow fever. See 1969 IHR, supra note 19.
195. 1969 IHR, supra note 19, arts. 3–7.
196. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 6(1), 9.
197. Id. art. 5(4) (requiring the WHO to “collect information regarding events through its surveillance activities”).
198. Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005):
Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, at 72–73, WHO Doc. A64/10 (May 5, 2011) (noting that
thirty-five percent of initial outbreak information came from open sources in 2009 and that internet
surveillance tools, such as ProMED and the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, are used
for “international epidemic intelligence”).
199. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, annex 1.
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with a WHO resolution delegating the organization’s staff to prepare an update for the old law. 200 Prior to 1995, the 1969 IHR appeared superficially
stable: The cholera provisions were slightly adjusted in 1973 and smallpox
was taken off of the list of reportable diseases due to its eradication in
1981. 201 The 1995 resolution led to three weeks of intergovernmental negotiations in 2004 and 2005, and the new law was adopted in May 2005. 202 The
ensuing illustrative examples dig below this superficial narrative to uncover
an entirely different story: The transformation in fact began decades earlier
as the 1969 IHR triggered persistent disagreement about how infectious diseases should be governed; changes originated in the very implementation of
the old law that was gradually being overridden; and entrepreneurial implementers tested the policies underlying the 2005 IHR on the ground, which in
turn facilitated the law’s subsequent enactment. A final example looks at the
evolution of one aspect of the 2005 IHR’s implementation since it came into
effect.
A. The Game
Treaties can change through the everyday process by which they are
informally implemented on the ground. Implementation is a source of dynamism because contestation over what an international agreement should be
does not end the moment it is negotiated. Rather, it extends into the treaty’s
implementation as a host of implementers, each motivated by their own interests and ideas for how the treaty should work, engage in a strategic game
to move the treaty in the direction they favor. 203 The implementation game

200. World Health Assembly Res. 48.7, supra note 25. There is universal accord in the literature on the 2005 IHR that it originates with this resolution. See, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam, Globalization of Infectious Diseases, International Law and the World Health Organization: Opportunities
for Synergy in Global Governance of Epidemics, 11 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 69 (2004);
Michael G. Baker & David P. Fidler, Global Public Health Surveillance Under New International
Health Regulations, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1058, 1058 (2006); David Bishop, Lessons from SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1173, 1175 (2005); David P. Fidler
& Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for
International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2006).
201. See WHO, International Health Regulations (2005) 1 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter 2005 IHR
(3d
ed.
2016)],
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/246107/9789241580496eng.pdf?sequence=1.
202. World Health Assembly Res. 58.3, Revision of the International Health Regulations, at 2,
WHO Doc. A58/VR/8 (May 23, 2005).
203. Following other authors’ writing about domestic statutes, I use the analogy of a game metaphorically, not in the game theory sense. See supra Section II.B; see also Daniel Peat & Matthew
Windsor, Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in International Law, in
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 28 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015) (similarly describing treaty interpretation metaphorically as a “game” in which the players deploy “rhetorical
strategies” to “secure adherence to their preferred interpretation”).
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is played not only by strategizing within the ambiguities of the existing agreement, but also by pushing the boundary between what the law condones or
authorizes and what it does not, blocking change to promote the treaty’s attrition and seeking opportunities to move management of the underlying
problem away from the treaty and toward a more favorable institutional option. For the proponents of change who are unsatisfied with the treaty as
negotiated, these may be more accessible ways to chip away at the compromise that was struck.
Political economist Carolyn Deere describes this dynamic at work in the
context of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”). She wrote that the negotiated agreement “left
both proponents and detractors dissatisfied, provoking post-agreement efforts from both sides to revise the contested text, sway its interpretation, and
influence how it was implemented.” 204 She described TRIPS implementation
as a “complex political game” that is closely connected to debates about possible revisions to the treaty text. 205
That same dynamic was at work in the early history of the 1969 IHR,
when there were conflicting perspectives on the nature and importance of the
infectious disease threat. On the one hand, domestic public health reforms,
improvements in water sanitation, and medical discoveries such as antibiotics
and vaccines created a sense of optimism in developed countries. In 1967,
the Surgeon General of the United States, William H. Stewart, famously declared that “the war against infectious diseases has been won.” 206 On the
other hand, patterns of infectious disease spread were shifting due to increased air travel, new interactions between humans and the environment,
and new transformations in human demography and behavior. In 1976,
American academic William McNeill warned that pathogens were a perpetual threat against which continued vigilance was necessary. 207
These perspectives gave rise to disagreement over the 1969 laws, which
was a barely-altered update to the 1951 International Sanitary Regulations
(“1951 ISR”). 208 In the course of implementing these laws, new patterns in
infectious disease spread were uncovered. A 1958 WHO report remarked
that the 1951 ISR had “come into action remarkably readily and well.” 209
204. DEERE, supra note 32, at 3.
205. Id.
206. David M. Morens, Gregory K. Folkers & Anthony S. Fauci, The Challenge of Emerging
and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, 430 NATURE 242, 242 (2004) (quoting William H. Stewart,
Surgeon General of the United States).
207. WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 257 (1976).
208. WHO, International Sanitary Regulations—World Health Organization Regulations No. 2,
May 25, 1951, 175 U.N.T.S. 214 [hereinafter 1951 ISR].
209. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
265–74 (1958).
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Ten years later, a subsequent WHO report warned of the “persisting and dangerous potentialities of cholera, plague and yellow fever,” as well as the appearance of new diseases and the increased prevalence of existing diseases
not covered by the 1969 IHR. 210
Some within the WHO lambasted the 1969 IHR for its failure to cover
the most relevant diseases and its reliance on inadequate self-reporting by
state parties. Erik Roelsgaard, head of the WHO’s Department of Epidemiology, argued in 1974 that diseases subject to the 1969 IHR were “pestilential
diseases of the past.” 211 Similarly, Ian Carter, the WHO’s Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of Communicable Diseases, advocated in 1981 for “the
surveillance of a disease and interchange of relevant information not on the
basis that it is included in a list but because it is of public health importance.” 212 In 1985, a report on the functioning of the 1969 IHR lamented
that the law allows “only official information supplied by national health authorities [to] be taken into account and disseminated,” though an outbreak
“ha[d] been reported in the media for several days.” 213 Even as the 1969 IHR
was being negotiated in 1968, Deputy Director-General Pierre Dorolle remarked that the 1951 ISR were “no longer adequate” and that a “thorough
and unbiased examination of the causes of failure of the present system and
the possible remedies is not only timely but long overdue.” 214
In 1978, staff within the WHO prepared and distributed to member
states a document discussing the IHR’s long-term future. The document contained a skeletal version of a proposed new set of regulations based on a shift
away from the traditional “barrier” approach that focused on preventing infections from crossing borders and toward an “epidemiological” approach
aimed at detecting and containing outbreaks at their source.215 It also envisioned a wider scope of disease coverage because “today’s developing technologies will continue to uncover diseases which are at present unknown.” 216
The proposal received uneven responses: Some countries were positive, some

210. WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
TION: 1958–1967, at 94(1968).

THE SECOND TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-

211. Erik Roelsgaard, Health Regulations and International Travel, 28 CHRON. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 265, 267 (1974).
212. Letter from Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of Communicable Diseases, World Health Org., to Jacobo Finkelman, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance for the Reg’l
Office of the Ams., World Health Org. (Feb. 10, 1981) (on file with author).
213. World Health Org., Functioning of the International Health Regulations for the Period 1
January to 31 December 1985 (Part I), 61 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 385, 388 (1986).
214. Pierre Dorolle, Old Plagues in the Jet Age. International Aspects of Present and Future
Control of Communicable Disease, 4 BRIT. MED. J. 789, 792 (1968).
215. World Health Org., The Long-Term Future of the International Health Regulations, 32
CHRON. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 439, 439, 441 (1978).
216. Id. at 440.
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were firmly against it, and some took the intermediary position of approving
the suggestions in theory but “inferr[ing] that time the was not yet ripe.” 217
After the global eradication of smallpox in 1979, an obvious opportunity
arose to revise the 1969 IHR. Anticipating that proposals for modifying the
law might soon be made, an internal policy memorandum forcefully argued
against a complete revision of the regulations. The memorandum emphasized the immense costs such a revision would entail and the unlikelihood
that significant changes would be possible: “[A] formal discussion of these
proposals [for revision] . . . could only lead to a compromise which would
not be satisfactory to any.” 218 Consequently, smallpox was removed from
the list of reportable diseases in 1981 without attempting to pursue further
textual change. Even in 1989, when the emergence of the AIDS epidemic
made it impossible to overlook the irrelevance of the 1969 IHR, the WHO’s
legal counsel maintained that “no one today seems to seriously contemplate
increasing the number of ‘diseases subject to the Regulations.’” 219
Though members of the WHO’s staff strategically bypassed an infeasible revision of the 1969 IHR, they pushed for changes to the law’s implementation in informal practice. In 1980, an internal memorandum recognized
the inadequacy of the old law while advising “one should avoid rushing [toward revision] and instead, in the meantime, prepare the ground for a change
by educational efforts, training and drawing the attention of the health officials to the need for an epidemiological approach to the control of the spread
of diseases internationally.” 220
B. The Players
A wide range of players were engaged in the dynamic and decentralized
game of informally implementing the 1969 IHR. Prominent among them
were state parties to the treaty, international organizations tasked with carrying out parts of the agreement, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
operating in the area, private entities, and epistemic communities of experts.
Implementation empowers actors who may not have had a substantial
say in the treaty’s initial formulation, either because they did not have enough
bargaining power or because they did not have a seat at the negotiating table.
Even within the same entity or organization, implementation may vest authority in a different subunit than was involved in negotiating the treaty’s

217. Memorandum from Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of Communicable Diseases, World Health Org., to Halfdan T. Mahler, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org. (Dec. 13,
1979) (on file with author).
218. Id.
219. Claude-Henri Vignes, The Future of International Health Law: WHO Perspectives, 40
INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 16, 18 (1989).
220. Memorandum from Boris Velimirovic to Ian D. Carter, supra note 41.

2019]

THE DYNAMISM OF TREATIES

863

text. As Eskridge notes with respect to domestic statutes, many interpretive
decisions are not made at the top of organizational hierarchies but rather at
the front-line: the lawyer’s office; the police officer’s beat; the bureaucrat’s
desk. 221 Similarly, the implementation of treaties lends influence to lowerlevel officials with technical knowledge, concrete information, and direct involvement on the ground. Due to their technical training, proximity to reallife events, and bureaucratic incentives, these front-line implementers may
have their own preferences for what the treaty should be.
Countries. States are typically treated as unitary actors in the international sphere. 222 This may be an adequate simplification when states send a
small team of diplomats to negotiate treaty text, but the assumption quickly
falls apart after the treaty comes into force, and implementation depends on
action by a myriad of sub-state actors. 223 The U.S. team that negotiated the
2005 IHR consisted principally of three delegates and a support team, 224
while implementing the agreement involves the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as
many state agencies, local governments, and individual hospitals and doctors
across the country. 225 Medical experts from within national public health
agencies frequently sit on advisory committees convened by the WHO and
make recommendations that are at odds with what the foreign affairs department can actually agree to in formal negotiations. 226 Sub-state actors are key
drivers of implementation dynamism. 227

221. ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 71–72.
222. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4 (2005) (explaining why the authors “give the state the starring role” as opposed to sub-state entities
such as the President or governmental departments).
223. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the
United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (2014) (noting that carrying out a treaty “often requires action from different parts of the domestic government”).
224. For the November 2004 round of negotiations, the core team consisted of the Ambassador
to Geneva, a state department representative, and the Health Attaché of the Permanent Mission to
Geneva, who was replaced by a representative from the Department of Health and Human Services
part way through. Intergovernmental Working Grp. for the Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations,
WHO, List of Participants, at 8, WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/DIV/3 Rev.1 (Nov. 4, 2004). For the
round of negotiations that took place in 2005, the team consisted of the Ambassador to Geneva, the
Health Attaché of the Permanent Mission to Geneva, and a state department representative. Intergovernmental Working Grp. for the Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, WHO, List of Participants, at 8, WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/2/DIV/3 Rev.2 (May 12, 2005).
225. The United States adopted the 2005 IHR subject to a contentious reservation maintaining
“the right to assume obligations under these Regulations in a manner consistent with its fundamental
principles of federalism.” 2005 IHR (3d ed. 2016), supra note 201, app. 2, at 60.
226. See infra Section III.C.
227. The possibility that minor government officials might bring about treaty changes beyond
the control of foreign affairs departments was one reason the draft Vienna Convention article allowing treaties to be modified by altered subsequent practice was rejected. Nolte, supra note 87, at
200–01 n.229.
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International organizations. Many treaties delegate responsibilities to
a centralized international organization with some autonomy. 228 The 1969
IHR, for example, relied on the WHO to receive disease notifications229 and
to disseminate that information back to state parties.230 The 2005 IHR relies
on the WHO even more—to conduct independent surveillance, 231 to verify
disease reports, 232 to determine whether a “public health emergency of international concern” is occurring, 233 and to collaborate with state parties in responding to outbreaks. 234 Yet, international organizations can develop and
pursue their own interests separate from those of its member states. 235 These
organizational interests typically stem from epistemic preferences surrounding a shared professional identity and common vision of what “good policy”
entails 236 or bureaucratic incentives relating to job security, prospects for advancement, and contests for funding. 237 In implementing treaties, international organizations may take actions that are undesired by member states by
minimizing efforts (shirking) or by shifting policy preferences to their own
(slippage). 238 Just as domestic administrative agencies are particularly wellpositioned to drive change in the dynamic game of statutory interpretation, 239
international organizations are well-positioned to push for new ways of treaty
implementation.
NGOs and private entities. NGOs and private entities may also have a
hand in and seek influence over a treaty’s implementation. They may be
regulated parties, such as airlines and cruise lines that are affected by international trade and travel restrictions required or authorized under infectious

228. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4 (1998) (arguing that states use international organizations as vehicles for cooperation because of the efficiency gains from centralization and the legitimacy gains from a degree of autonomy).
229. 1969 IHR, supra note 19, arts. 3–8.
230. Id. art. 11.
231. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 5(4).
232. Id. art. 10.
233. Id. art. 12.
234. Id. art. 13(3).
235. See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699 (1999) (arguing that international organizations can exude “dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior” when they “exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated” by the states that created them).
236. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 5 (2004).
237. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 235, at 716–17.
238. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations,
and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 8
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
239. See supra Section II.B.
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disease regulations. 240 They may be activist NGOs promoting their own
agendas or operating through another organization. Doctors Without Borders, for instance, treated over ten thousand patients during the recent Ebola
epidemic 241 and was one of the most vocal critics of the WHO and the 2005
IHR. 242 Private donors, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and
pharmaceutical companies, are also able to influence implementation indirectly through their monetary contributions to the WHO, individual countries, and outbreak control efforts. 243 Approximately eighty percent of the
WHO’s program budget comes from voluntary donations, 244 including significant amounts over ten percent from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 245 These non-governmental and private actors have shaped the implementation of international infectious disease law.
Epistemic communities. Implementation may be shaped by loose networks of technical experts with an authoritative claim on policy knowledge
within an issue area. Peter M. Haas calls these networks “epistemic communities” and defines them by their members’ shared normative beliefs, causal
beliefs, and common policy enterprise. 246 Epistemic communities can influence implementation choices by controlling information, framing issues, and
suggesting solutions. 247 The Federation of American Scientists, for instance,
played a critical role in developing internet outbreak surveillance tools during
the 1990s, as discussed below. Epistemic communities also exert influence
when their members weave in and out of other institutions. One example is
240. The International Shipping Federation, the International Air Transport Association, and the
International Council of Cruise Lines all submitted comments to the WHO in 2004 prior to the 2005
IHR’s negotiation. See Comment, Int’l Shipping Fed’n, Draft International Health Regulations
(Mar. 1, 2004), https://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/IHr.pdf?ua=1; Comment, Int’l Air Transp.
Ass’n, Comments of International Air Transport Association (IATA) on Draft International Health
Regulations (Apr. 21, 2004), https://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/iatacomments.pdf?ua=1;
Comment, Int’l Council of Cruise Lines, Draft International Health Regulations (July 28, 2004),
https://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/ICCL2004_07_28.pdf?ua=1.
241. MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, EBOLA 2014–2015 FACTS & FIGURES: KEY FINANCIAL
DATA ON MSF’S RESPONSE TO THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC IN WEST AFRICA 2 (2016),
http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/ebola_accountability_report_low_res.pdf.
242. See Dr. Joanne Liu, Int’l President, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Remarks at the Gates Foundation Global Partner Forum (May 8, 2015), http://www.msf.org/en/article/remarks-internationalpresident-msf-dr-joanne-liu-gates-foundation-global-partner-forum (stating that the WHO’s slow
response and lack of capacity and expertise to respond to epidemics “caused untold suffering and
death”).
243. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
244. World Health Assembly Res. 68.1, Programme Budget 2016–2017 (May 22, 2015). The
WHO’s program budget for the 2016 to 2017 financial period consisted of $4385 million in total
funding, $3456 million of which were voluntary contributions. Id.
245. WHO, Voluntary Contributions by Fund and by Contributor, 2016, at 8, WHO Doc.
A70/INF./4 (May 16, 2017).
246. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 2–3 (1992).
247. Id. at 2.
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David Heymann, who was appointed the WHO’s Assistant Director-General
for Communicable Diseases in 2007. 248 He held various other roles within
the WHO, led the WHO’s response to the SARS outbreak in 2003, previously
worked for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and is now
a Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, where he authors works pushing for changes to
the 2005 IHR’s implementation. 249
C. The Strategies
In theory, those unsatisfied with a treaty as written can withdraw, seek
its formal interpretation or reinterpretation by an authoritative adjudicatory
body, or lobby to revise its text according to the Vienna Convention or revision provisions within the treaty itself. But withdrawal is a blunt tool available only to state parties; authoritative adjudication rarely occurs even when
formal procedures for dispute resolution exist; and revision is typically infeasible until the political climate leading to the initial compromise shifts.
During the decades after the 1969 IHR came into force, each of these
constraints were in place. Nearly all of the WHO’s member states were state
parties to the 1969 IHR, 250 yet no party withdrew despite well-recognized
problems with the treaty. The 1969 IHR contained a formal adjudicatory
process by which disputes not settled by the WHO’s executive head could
then be referred to a committee within the WHO and finally to the ICJ. 251
But disputes were almost exclusively dealt with through the WHO’s informal
mediation efforts. A WHO committee was convened only once—to address
a 1970 controversy involving Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria 252—and no disputes have been referred to the ICJ. As noted above, proposals from the
WHO’s staff to dramatically revise the text of the 1969 IHR did not receive
enough support from member states to be politically feasible. 253 Consequently, the 1969 IHR was revised in only marginal ways prior to 2005. In
1973, the provisions on cholera were adjusted; and in 1981, smallpox was
removed from the list of reportable diseases in view of its eradication. 254

248. Hannah Brown, WHO Director-General Announces Senior Team, 369 LANCET 893, 894
(2007).
249. See Professor David Heymann CBE, CHATHAM HOUSE, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/prof-david-l-heymann-cbe (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (describing his experiences
in global health).
250. See 1969 IHR, supra note 19, annex I.
251. Id. art. 93.
252. DAVID M. LEIVE, 1 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN HEALTH,
METEOROLOGY, AND FOOD 54–64 (1976).
253. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
254. See 2005 IHR (3d ed. 2016), supra note 201, at 1.
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These modest revisions belie the far-reaching changes that were in fact occurring gradually via the law’s implementation in practice.
Implementation offers those seeking change unique opportunities that
might otherwise be unavailable. It presents new questions or new permutations of old questions, which, in turn, open up space to redefine the boundary
between what the law condones or authorizes and what it does not, or to layer
additional informal practices on top of those connected to the existing
treaty. 255 Informal implementation dynamism is easier to achieve because
the change is initially limited to a particular instance and the particular parties
involved in that instance. It, therefore, requires less consensus and less commitment. And, it curtails concerns about uncertainty and sovereignty since
the circumstances are concrete and known. 256 Informal implementation
changes are frequently not announced as a “change” to the treaty at issue and
do not require sign-off by the same high-level officials or high-profile departments whose approval would be needed to alter the treaty’s text. For the
same reasons, informal implementation dynamism is harder to detect and
block for those not in favor of the change.
Informal implementation-level change also has drawbacks and limits. It
is smaller in scale, less official, and its impact initially limited to the instance
at hand. A change in implementation may be abandoned soon after it is invented, or its impact may grow over time—gradually expanding until what
happens on the ground bears little relation to the original intention of the
treaty-makers or the words of the treaty. Informal implementation-level
change can also initiate a learning process by which new information is generated, uncertainty reduced, and preferences altered such that a textual
amendment becomes more likely in the future.
Below, I sketch three mechanisms of informal implementation-level
change: (1) erosion of the treaty through neglect or active efforts; (2) transition to another institutional option for addressing the underlying problem;
and (3) conversion of the treaty from within via altered practice. 257 These
three mechanisms are presented along with illustrative examples from the
international regulation of infectious disease. For the sake of coherence, they
are presented in the chronological order in which the historical episodes occurred. This Section presents these mechanisms in isolation, but as the examples show, they often operate in tandem.

255. This insight draws both from the history of international infectious disease regulation and
the literature on institutional change. See supra Section II.C.
256. The advantages of implementation dynamism are similar to those of soft law. See Abbott
& Snidal, supra note 36, at 423.
257. These mechanisms are observed from the history of international infectious disease regulation, the literature on institutional change, and they draw insights from the literature on institutional change. See infra notes 258–316 and accompanying text.
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Erosion of the treaty through neglect or active efforts.258 This mechanism of implementation dynamism is driven by inaction in the face of change.
Contextual conditions shift while the treaty remains constant, opening up
gaps between the existing agreement and the real world, and weakening the
treaty’s impact on the ground. Such failure to upkeep a treaty may occur due
to neglect or abdication of responsibilities, or it may be deliberately cultivated through intentional decisions and actions that promote a treaty’s atrophy.
This mechanism is a more moderate version of Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention, which allows a state party to terminate or withdraw from a treaty
when circumstances constituting an “essential basis of the consent of the parties” change fundamentally and unforeseeably such that “the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty” is “radically . . . transform[ed].” 259 Compared to Article 62, which has never been successfully
asserted judicially or in a diplomatic setting, 260 erosion in the face of drifting
circumstances is more common, gradual, and subtle. Over time, erosion can
radically transform a treaty’s significance and impact in practice, even in the
absence of termination, withdrawal, or any other formal change.
Within the context of international infectious disease regulation, erosion
of the 1969 IHR accompanied the strategic decision to pursue informal implementation change on the ground. Once the WHO’s staff and likeminded
members of the epistemic community determined that the revisions they
sought to the 1969 IHR were politically infeasible, they chose to deliberately
neglect the law and, in some instances, to push it toward irrelevance. In an
internal memorandum explaining the decision, one WHO official recalled the
“serious attempt” that was made to revise the 1951 ISR between 1966 and
1969, with significant investment in time and money. 261 He bemoaned that
no significant amendment could be agreed upon except for the removal of
typhus and relapsing fever and “[c]ertainly the revision has had no effect on
the day to day administration of the IHR.” 262
Not only was the decision to neglect the 1969 IHR considered, but it
was actively cultivated in an effort to minimize the law’s import while it remained on the books. In a number of incidents and publications, the 1969
IHR was increasingly framed not as an independent mandate, but as one aspect of a larger strategy for infectious disease control. In 1970, the WHO’s
258. This mechanism of erosion is similar to what scholars of institutional change call “drift.”
See MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 17 (“Drift occurs when rules remain formally the
same but their impact changes as a result of shifts in external conditions.”); Streeck & Thelen, supra
note 174, at 24–26 (also discussing drift).
259. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 62.
260. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
261. Memorandum from Ian D. Carter to Halfdan T. Mahler, supra note 217.
262. Id.
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staff publicized information regarding a cholera outbreak in Guinea that had
not been reported under the 1969 IHR. 263 In so doing, WHO officials
acknowledged that they were operating outside the 1969 law but justified the
act by reference to a broader mandate: “[I]n order to fulfil the Organization’s
obligations under Article 2 of the WHO Constitution, the presence of cholera
should be disclosed in the absence of notification when reliable technical evidence is available.” 264 The implication was that the Secretariat’s wider and
more ambiguous mandate under the WHO’s Constitution took priority over
its narrower mandate under the 1969 IHR—an argument that had little legal
or historical basis.
The 1969 IHR was further relegated to a lower status in a 1985 WHO
publication on the functioning of the IHR. That publication argued that reporting under the 1969 IHR “represents one of the ways in which epidemiological information circulates among countries” but “would not be sufficient
in isolation, because unusual events need to be detected and brought to the
notice of other countries as and when they happen.” 265 The focus on “unusual
events” rather than the three diseases requiring notification at the time is significant: The same report on the functioning of the IHR documented not only
the status of those three diseases but also included a section on “[o]ther diseases,” including influenza, malaria, and poliomyelitis. 266 Notifications under the 1969 IHR gradually occupied a smaller and smaller part of the Weekly
Epidemiological Record 267 and constituted only one small paragraph at the
end of a lengthy report by the early 1980s.
Transition to another institutional arrangement. 268 This mechanism of
change involves multiple institutional options for managing an underlying
263. World Health Org., Cholera: Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa, 45
WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 377, 377 (1970).
264. Id.
265. World Health Org., supra note 213, at 385–86 (emphasis added).
266. This section is omitted in the reprint of the report in Volume 61, Number 50 of the Weekly
Epidemiological Report, see World Health Org., supra note 213, at 385–91, but is in the original
report located in the WHO Archives for the 1969 IHR. See WHO, Functioning of the International
Health Regulations for the Period 1 January to 31 December 1985 (Dec. 1986) (on file with author).
267. The Weekly Epidemiological Record is a weekly publication disseminating standardized
health statistics that began in 1929 under the Health Organization of the League of Nations. Margaret Harris, A Journey Through 90 Years of the Weekly Epidemiological Record, 91 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 169, 169 (2016).
268. This mechanism of transition is similar to two mechanisms identified by scholars of institutional change: displacement (“when new institutions are introduced and directly compete with
(rather than supplement) an older set of institutions”) and layering (“when new rules are attached to
existing ones, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behavior”). MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 16. The difference between the two mechanisms is that displacement “introduce[s] wholly new institutions or rules,” whereas layering “involves amendments,
revisions, or additions to existing ones.” Id.; see also Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 19–24.
I do not differentiate between wholly new rules and additions to existing ones because that distinction is often difficult to make in the international infectious disease regulation context. There is
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problem. One of these institutional options is the treaty at issue. The others
may take a number of forms: another international treaty, a domestic law, or
perhaps a policy implemented by the same or different actors or agencies,
whether international or local. The other institutional option may already
exist and is repurposed, or it may be created—through the active sponsorship
of new rules or policies on top of or alongside existing ones—for the purpose
of moving away from the disfavored treaty. In either case, the problem is
reframed or resituated such that it comes under the purview of a different
institutional structure. The mechanism may not initially look like a change
to the treaty at all since the development begins outside of the treaty. But as
the transition progresses, there is a gradual shifting of relative prominence
away from the treaty and toward the other institutional option, potentially
leading to the crowding out of the disfavored treaty.
Transitions to both existing alternative institutional arrangements and
newly created ones played important roles in the history of international infectious disease regulation. A well-recognized weakness of the 1969 IHR
was its reliance on self-reporting of covered diseases by state parties. The
WHO neither had the capacity to conduct its own surveillance nor the authority to publish unreported information even when such information “ha[d]
been reported in the media for several days.” 269 In a 1979 policy memorandum, one WHO official wrote: “The one thing that [the Department of Epidemiological Surveillance of Diseases] does not do in the true sense of the
word is the surveillance of communicable disease.”270 When the WHO’s
staff decided not to pursue an amendment to the 1969 IHR and instead to
minimize its importance, they also began undertaking concurrent efforts to
move infectious disease reporting beyond the confines of the 1969 law.
Movement to an existing alternative institutional arrangement is illustrated by the above example concerning the 1970 cholera outbreak in
Guinea. 271 There, neglect and violation of the 1969 IHR was facilitated by
an appeal to another mandate—the WHO’s Constitution. Movement to a
newly created alternative is illustrated by the WHO’s development of novel
outbreak surveillance tools and policies during the 1990s. Here, the WHO
collaborated with domestic actors and agencies to devise additional channels
of reporting that initially seemed unrelated to the 1969 IHR. These channels
became more salient over time and received post hoc approval, first through
two WHO resolutions and then by the adoption of the 2005 IHR.
With the popularization of the internet in the 1990s, the WHO collaborated with a community of national medical experts to develop two global
much cross-referencing across WHO reports, resolutions, and laws, making it difficult to tell
whether a new initiative or rule is an addition or wholly new.
269. World Health Org., supra note 213, at 388.
270. Memorandum from Ian D. Carter to Halfdan T. Mahler, supra note 217.
271. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
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surveillance tools that provided an alternative to official reporting under the
1969 IHR. The first was the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases
(“ProMED”). Created in 1993 by attendees at a conference co-sponsored by
the WHO and the Federation of American Scientists, ProMED is an e-mailbased system for providing early warnings of emerging epidemics involving
humans, animals, and plants. 272 It began with forty subscribers and opened
to the public at no cost in November 1994. 273 By April 2004, ProMED
reached nearly 35,000 direct subscribers in over 180 countries in addition to
secondary disseminators. 274 Its subscribers include WHO personnel, UN humanitarian agencies, national public health agencies, and interested members
of the public. 275
The second surveillance tool was the Global Public Health Information
Network (“GPHIN”), a cooperative venture between Health Canada and the
WHO, developed in the mid-1990s. 276 GPHIN gathers information by monitoring global media sources twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Using news aggregators such as Factiva, 277 GPHIN filters items first through
an automated scanning system that identifies keywords, and then by human
analysts working in multiple languages. Subscription to GPHIN is restricted
to organizations with an established public health mandate, such as the WHO,
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and military agencies. 278
Over the course of the next few years, ProMED and GPHIN were increasingly relied on for early warnings of outbreaks and became routinely
used both within and without the WHO. ProMED posted early warnings of
the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, the 1996 cholera outbreak in the Philippines, and the Ebola outbreak in Gabon that same year—with the latter two
outbreaks being publicized on ProMED before the WHO was authorized to
report them. The WHO used this information to initiate conversations with
national governments, verify the rumored outbreaks, and offer assistance in
containing the outbreaks. Between July 1998 and August 2001, the WHO

272. Lawrence C. Madoff & John P. Woodall, The Internet and the Global Monitoring of
Emerging Diseases: Lessons from the First 10 Years of ProMED-mail, 36 ARCHIVES MED. RES.
724, 724 (2005).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 725–29.
275. Id. at 726.
276. About GPHIN, PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., https://gphin.canada.ca/cepr/aboutgphinrmispenbref.jsp?language=en_CA (last modified Mar. 15, 2017).
(last visited May 30, 2019).
277. Factiva aggregates thousands of news sources in 28 languages from nearly 200 countries.
Factiva: About, PROQUEST, https://proquest.libguides.com/factiva (last visited May 13, 2019).
278. Interview with Abla Mawudeku, Chief of Glob. Pub. Health Info. Network, Ctr. for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Pub. Health Agency of Can., Ottawa (Jan. 5, 2007).
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verified 578 outbreaks in 132 countries, fifty-six percent of which were initially picked up by GPHIN. 279 Outbreaks reported through these surveillance
tools included those within the scope of the 1969 IHR as well as those beyond
it. 280 By 2003, “nonstate sources delivered far more actionable surveillance”
than official national reporting. 281
The use of unofficial sources of outbreak information received retrospective approval. In 1998, the WHO’s staff sought and received partial authorization for the practice in a resolution unrelated to the 1969 IHR. WHO
officials drafted and submitted to member states a report describing the rapid
emergence and spread of drug-resistant pathogens and outlining necessary
solutions, including better surveillance to define the extent of resistance in
different pathogens and populations. 282 Based on this report, member states
adopted a resolution authorizing the WHO to “devise means for the gathering
and sharing of information by countries and regions concerning resistance in
certain pathogens.” 283
That authorization was expanded in 2001 through another report and
resolution on epidemic alert and response. This report noted that only
twenty-three percent of outbreak notifications received by the WHO came
from national self-reporting, “while the most significant source was the
Global Public Health Information Network of Canada.” 284 The resolution
urged member states to “participate actively” in the verification of surveillance information. 285
By the time negotiations for the 2005 IHR began in 2004, the WHO had
been conducting independent surveillance and relying on unofficial sources
of outbreak information for years. It was no longer controversial and did not
receive much attention during the two rounds of negotiations. 286 The 2005

279. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 2002: GLOBAL
THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT 60 (Mary Kay Kindhauser ed., 2003).

DEFENCE AGAINST

280. See id.
281. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 27, at 19–20.
282. Director-General, WHO, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases: Antimicrobial Resistance, at 1–3, WHO Doc. EB101/13 (Oct. 22, 1997).
283. World Health Assembly Res. 51.17, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases: Antimicrobial Resistance, ¶ 2, WHO Doc. A51/VR/10 (May 16, 1998).
284. Exec. Bd., WHO, Summary Records for Its Third Meeting of the 107th Session, at 42,
WHO Doc. EB107/2001/REC/2 (Jan. 16, 2001).
285. World Health Assembly Res. 54.14, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response,
¶ 2, WHO Doc. A54/VR/9 (May 21, 2001).
286. Although there is no publicly available verbatim record of the negotiations, the lack of
attention to reliance on unofficial sources of outbreak information is evident by comparing several
draft negotiating texts and the final adopted law. The provisions on unofficial sources remain
largely the same. Compare Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, WHO, International Health Regulations: Working Paper for Regional Consultations, at
7–9, WHO Doc. IGWG/IHR/Working paper/12.2003 (Jan. 12, 2004) (containing the draft negoti-
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IHR explicitly requires the WHO to “collect information” concerning outbreaks “through its surveillance activities” 287 and to “take into account reports from sources other than notifications” from state parties. 288
Transition to another institutional option is particularly significant in the
international context given the fragmented and nonhierarchical nature of the
international sphere. Political science scholars have observed that many
countries belong to a plethora of nested and overlapping international institutions, including those that are universal, regional, and issue specific. 289 The
rising density of international regulatory regimes has led to overlap across
agreements, conflicts between them, and confusion regarding which obligations cover a given issue. 290 Legal scholars describe the international legal
system as diffuse, decentralized, and “shaped by dynamics of cooperation
and competition over time.” 291 This environment of complexity and fragmentation gives rise to an abundance of opportunities to shift management of
an underlying problem to other institutional options or actors, altering the
implementation of a treaty on the ground without any explicit changes to the
treaty itself.
Conversion of the treaty from within through altered practice. 292 Conversion is perhaps the most familiar mechanism of informal implementation
dynamism to lawyers. It occurs when a treaty is directed toward new purposes by operating within the ambiguities of the text and pushing against the
limits of what the text means. In the judicial context, conversion occurs
through reinterpretation by authoritative adjudicative bodies. In the informal
implementation context, conversion occurs when implementers work within
and push against the limits of treaty text to put the agreement into practice in
a new way. Since the 2005 IHR came into effect in 2007, there has been one
ating text as of January 2004, prior to the first round of intergovernmental negotiations), and Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, WHO, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Draft Revision, at 9–10,
WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/3 (Sept. 30, 2004) (containing the draft negotiating text as of September
2004, prior to the first round of intergovernmental negotiations), and Chair of the Intergovernmental
Working Grp. on Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, WHO, Review and Approval of Proposed
Amendments to the International Health Regulations, at 7–9, WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/2/2 (Jan.
24, 2005) (containing the draft negotiating text as of January 2005, in between the two rounds of
intergovernmental negotiations), with 2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 5–10.
287. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 5(4).
288. Id. art. 9(1).
289. See Alter & Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes, supra note 32, at 362–63; Alter
& Raustiala, supra note 32, at 329.
290. Alter & Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, supra note 32, at 13.
291. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 443
(2003).
292. This mechanism is similar to what scholars of institutional change also call “conversion.”
See MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 17 (“Conversion occurs when rules remain formally
the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways.”); Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 26–
29.
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minor amendment in 2014: The period of effectiveness for the yellow fever
vaccination was extended from ten years to the life of the person vaccinated. 293 By contrast, informal implementation conversion has introduced
far more significant changes.
A critical subject of contention during the 2005 IHR negotiations was
the proposed requirement that state parties develop a minimum level of core
public health capacity so that they are able to detect, report, and respond
promptly to “public health emergenc[ies] of international concern.” 294 Numerous member states protested that the requirement was “very onerous,”
expressed concern about sovereignty implications, demanded a commitment
to transfer resources to the poorest countries, and argued that the law should
allow adequate time for changes to take place.295
Negotiating states were not able to come to a consensus on many of
these issues. Ultimately, the 2005 IHR postponed the law’s entry into force
to two years after adoption (2007) and set the deadline for attaining core capacity requirements at five years (2012) with the possibility of two two-year
extensions (to 2014 and 2016). 296 The WHO must, “to the extent possible,”
help states evaluate existing capacities and mobilize financial resources to
support developing countries’ efforts to build and maintain the required capacities. 297 State parties must “undertake to collaborate with each other, to
the extent possible,” in developing capacities and in mobilizing financial resources for general implementation. 298 No quantitative financial commitments were made. At the time of its adoption, scholars identified the law’s
lack of stronger provisions for transferring financial and technical resources
as a “a serious problem.” 299
During the years after the 2005 IHR went into effect, capacity building
was an area of persistent difficulty. After the H1N1 influenza pandemic in
2009, a review committee of national public health experts convened by the

293. World Health Assembly Res. 67.13, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), ¶ 2, WHO Doc. A67/VR/9 (May 24, 2014).
294. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 6(1).
295. See WHO Proposals for the Revision of the International Health Regulations: Comments
Received, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/comments/en/ (last visited May 13, 2019) (listing comments received from various countries and “other interested partners” prior to and between the two rounds of intergovernmental negotiations).
296. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 5(1)–(2), 13(1)–(2), annex 1; 2005 IHR (3d ed. 2016), supra
note 201, at 1.
297. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 44(2).
298. Id. art. 44(1).
299. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 200, at 88.
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WHO recommended first and foremost that the implementation of core capacities be accelerated.300 The Ebola outbreak in 2013 to 2016, which resulted in more than 11,000 deaths, 301 was attributed to “large-scale noncompliance” with the 2005 IHR’s capacity-building requirements in the three
countries most affected by the epidemic—Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 302 By November 2014, only thirty-three percent of state parties selfreported that they had met the capacity requirements, while forty-two percent
requested a second extension to 2016, and twenty-five percent did not communicate their intentions to the WHO at all. 303
Members of the infectious disease epistemic community identified several weaknesses in the capacity-building aspect of the 2005 IHR and argued
that the law “need[ed] more teeth.” 304 Chief among these weaknesses were
reliance on self-assessment and self-reporting by member states and the absence of standing financial commitments 305—issues that could not be resolved during the 2005 IHR’s negotiation and remained contentious in subsequent years. 306 Legal and public health experts suggested independent
evaluations of domestic public health capacities and clearer benchmarks, 307

300. Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005),
¶ 8, WHO Doc. A65/17 (Mar. 22, 2012).
301. Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005):
Rep. of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the
Ebola Outbreak and Response, ¶ 1, WHO Doc. A69/21 (May 13, 2016).
302. David P. Fidler, Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security, 21 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 179, 187 (2015).
303. Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005):
Rep. of the Review Committee on Second Extensions for Establishing National Public Health Capacities and on IHR Implementation, at 2, WHO Doc. EB136/22 Add.1 (Jan. 16, 2015).
304. Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Report by the Director-General to the
Special
Session
of
the
Executive
Board
on
Ebola
(Jan.
25,
2015),
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/executive-board-ebola/en/.
305. See, e.g., Rebecca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A
Framework for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 1, 9 (2010) (noting
that lack of financial commitments was the 2005 IHR’s “greatest operational challenge”).
306. Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next
Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola,
386 LANCET 2204, 2209 (2015).
307. Director-General, supra note 303, ¶ 43 (recommending that the WHO “consider a variety
of approaches for the shorter- and longer-term assessment and development of IHR core capacities,”
including regional formal evaluations or meta-evaluations); COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS DISEASE CRISES 33 (2016) (suggesting that a “regular, independent, transparent, and objective assessment mechanism” be devised to evaluate national capacity
building); Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The International Health Regulations 10 Years on: The Governing Framework for Global Health Security, 386 LANCET 2222, 2224 (2015) (recommending that
the “WHO should establish an independent peer-review core capacity evaluation system”); Moon
et al., supra note 306, at 2204 (“[A]ll governments must agree to regular, independent, external
assessment of their core capacities.”).
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which could be tied to the provision of external financing. 308 A 2016 WHO
report on the 2005 IHR concluded that, after Ebola, “exclusive use of this
[self-assessment] approach is no longer appropriate” and that “over-reliance
on self-assessment has led to incomplete and unreliable reporting of core capacities.” 309
While there was discussion about revising the 2005 IHR to stipulate
more concrete requirements for building public health capacities, 310 there was
also fear that “reopening the full text could entail a multiyear negotiating
process.” 311 A number of experts recommended against “renegotiating the
main text of the International Health Regulations,” and instead suggested
pursuing the proposed legal reforms through “informal means” such as textual reinterpretation. 312 Again, informal implementation-level change served
as a more feasible alternative to formal change.
Over the last few years, the WHO and other members of the epistemic
community have worked to convert the meaning of the 2005 IHR’s core capacity requirements while also transitioning some of its implementation to
other institutional arrangements. In 2016, the WHO developed a “Joint External Evaluation Tool” for monitoring, assessing, and reporting core capacities. 313 That tool has been operationalized by a newly-formed Joint External
Evaluation Alliance (“the Alliance”) comprised of seventy-two members, including thirty-one countries and a range of international organizations, development banks, NGOs, and private foundations. 314 The Alliance draws its
legal mandate from not only the 2005 IHR, but also the UN’s sustainable
development goal on good health and well-being, standards generated by the
World Organisation for Animal Health, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 315 As of May 24, 2019, ninety-six external evaluations
have been conducted in six regions, with twenty-one more scheduled. 316
308. Moon et al., supra note 306, at 2209 (“Monitoring requirements should accompany external financing.”).
309. Director-General, supra note 301, ¶¶ 28, 29.
310. Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of the
West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation
and an Empowered WHO at the Apex, 385 LANCET 1902, 1906 (2015) (“The World Health Assembly should revise the IHR to provide concrete steps for building health system capacities.”)
311. Gostin et al., supra note 307, at 2223.
312. Id.; see also COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, supra
note 307, at 33 (“It should not be necessary to open the 2005 IHR to renegotiation to determine new
definitions and benchmarks [for national capacity-building requirements], since these could be developed through informal means . . . .”).
313. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION TOOL: INTERNAHEALTH
REGULATIONS
(2005)
(2016),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitTIONAL
stream/10665/204368/1/9789241510172_eng.pdf?ua=1.
314. Members, JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/members/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
315. About, JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
316. Joint External Evaluation (JEE), JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/global-health-security-and-ihr-implementation/joint-external-evaluation-jee/ (last visited May 30, 2019).
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IV. INVESTIGATING WRITTEN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME
Peeling back the textual and formal façade of the 1969 and 2005 IHRs
reveals a richly dynamic world of informal implementation that unfolded in
unpredictable ways as the treaties were put into practice over long spans of
time. This history cannot be captured by the Vienna Convention’s doctrinal
concept of subsequent practice, and suggests that treaty dynamism is far more
varied and complex than depicted by existing scholarship. Focusing on formal change mechanisms generates a picture that is not only incomplete but
also potentially misleading. It can underestimate the level of dynamism when
a treaty is apparently static, overestimate the level of dynamism when a treaty
is explicitly amended, and provide an inaccurate portrayal of how the underlying problem was in fact managed on the ground. In the infectious disease
context, informal implementation-level change was neither secondary in importance, nor sequential in temporal order, to formal changes to the treaty’s
text, membership, or judicial interpretation.
Exposing the informal implementation dynamism of treaties opens up
new questions while challenging assumptions at the heart of our current understanding of written international law.
Empirical questions. More empirical studies are needed to determine
how generalizable insights drawn from the international regulation of infectious disease are to other areas of international law. The prevalence and significance of informal change has been noted by other scholars in areas such
as intellectual property and trade, suggesting that similar dynamics are at
work elsewhere. 317 Yet, the 1969 and 2005 IHRs are unique in certain respects. Unlike the usual opt-in and ratification processes, these agreements
were adopted by a majority vote of the WHO’s policy-making organ, composed of representatives from all member states, 318 and came into force after
a period of time for all member states except those that opted out or submitted
reservations. 319 Compared to other multilateral treaties, these agreements are
very widely subscribed to, with the 2005 IHR now being legally binding on

317. See DEERE, supra note 32; Levit, supra note 32.
318. The WHO’s policy-making organ is the World Health Assembly. See World Health Assembly, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly
(last visited June 3, 2019).
319. This streamlined treaty adoption process is set out in Article 21 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization and authorizes the World Health Assembly to adopt regulations on five
specific subject areas, including the prevention of international disease spread. See WORLD
HEALTH ORG., Constitution of the World Health Organization, in BASIC DOCUMENTS 1, 7–8 (48th
ed. 2014).
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196 state parties. 320 And these treaties are administered by the WHO’s centralized bureaucracy of experts 321 and concern a technical, “low politics”
topic. The overall implication of these features for the likelihood of informal
versus formal change is unclear. One might expect formal change to be easier
and therefore informal change less prominent given the streamlined adoption
and revision process; one might expect the opposite given the large number
of state parties involved and the presence of a centralized bureaucracy. Both
formal and informal change might be more difficult in a “high politics” area.
Studies across subject matters and treaty types are needed not only to
test the extensibility of this Article’s findings, but also to explore further empirical puzzles, including when informal implementation change is preferable
to alternatives such as unilateral withdrawal and creating a rival agreement, 322 how the three mechanisms of informal implementation dynamism
interact with each other, and when implementers choose one strategy over
another. These empirical questions call for methodologies that are appropriate for investigating international law in time. Studies that are deep (delving
beneath the text and authoritative interpretation of a treaty to examine the
often-hidden actors and processes that translate it into practice), wide (examining not only the treaty at issue but other laws, policies, and institutions that
might provide oblique channels for change), and long (looking past snapshots
of the treaty to observe its continuous evolution across extended periods of
time) are needed to see the full panoply of change in action.
Conceptual questions. The vast scope of change achievable through informal implementation dynamism and its ability to precipitate future textual
amendment suggest that we need to rethink our very idea of what written
international law is. For decades, the study of international law has been
permeated with existential anxieties about enforcement problems and noncompliance, 323 where measuring compliance “merely requires comparing the
relevant activity with the treaty’s requirements.” 324 Underlying this empha-

320. States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005), supra note 190.
321. Much like an executive agency, the WHO’s day-to-day activities are run by its Secretariat—a permanent staff composed of thousands of experts that exercise some degree of autonomy.
See WHO—Organizational Structure, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/about/who-weare/structure (last visited June 3, 2019).
322. I thank Laurence Helfer for pointing out this question.
323. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743,
747 (2013); Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 199 (1980); Rachel Brewster,
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 231, 231 (2009); Cogan, supra note 77, at
189; Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1293
(1985).
324. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1964 (2002).
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sis on compliance and the straightforward portrayal of the relationship between “the relevant activity” and “the treaty’s requirements” is an unspoken
conceptual model that casts international agreements as blueprints awaiting
faithful execution. The dynamism of “the relevant activity” and its capacity
to sometimes leap ahead of and foreshadow “the treaty’s requirements” cuts
at the very core of this model. In fact, treaties may more accurately be described as departure points for further bargaining among implementers as
constraints and opportunities reveal themselves over time. 325
Recognizing the full range of treaty dynamism brings to a head a number of criticisms on the study of compliance. Measuring the level of compliance provides little insight on its significance and consequences over time.
A high rate of compliance does not necessarily signal that a treaty is effectively addressing the underlying problem, 326 nor does it mean that a treaty
has caused change in state behavior. 327 Conversely, a low rate of compliance
is not necessarily deleterious, since not all noncompliance is equal. Some
noncompliance may be inevitable or may even serve a purpose. 328 As observed from the international infectious disease case study, problems with
enforcement are often opportunities that open up space for future change.
More nuanced investigations are needed to untangle the relationship between
compliance and informal implementation change.

325. Similar observations have been made about domestic policies and implementation. See
Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation as Evolution (1979), in IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S
AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO BUILD
MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 163, 164–68 (Jeffrey L. Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky eds., 3d ed. 1984) (discussing models of implementation as control and implementation as
interaction).
326. See, e.g., George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1996); Lisa L. Martin, Against Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE
OF THE ART, supra note 34, at 591–92.
327. Authors note the difficulty of establishing causation since the decision to commit to an
international law is entangled with the decision to comply. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Treaty
Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273, 275 (2010) (“[Almost] all studies of the
influence of treaties on state behavior encounter serious issues of endogeneity and selection.”).
328. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175,
188 (1993) (arguing that only infrequently is treaty violation the result of “willful flouting of legal
obligation” whereas, most of the time, violations arise from “(1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of
treaty language, (2) limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, and (3) the
temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated by regulatory treaties”);
Cogan, supra note 77, at 190–91, 204–05 (discussing the benefits of “operational noncompliance,”
which occurs when states breach international law even as they try to promote it, an example being
the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of
International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 243, 245–46 (2011) (discussing efficient breach).
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Normative questions. More thinking is also needed on the question of
whether informal implementation dynamism is normatively desirable. On
the one hand, informal change could undermine the formal negotiation and
consent-based processes laid out in the Vienna Convention that currently underpins the legitimacy of written international law. Informal change can take
international lawmaking out of public view and beyond the control of any
one state party. It can detract from international law’s predictability if a
treaty might mean something different tomorrow than it does today. And it
can weaken the commitment signaled by joining an international agreement
in the first place if informal implementation change becomes widely expected. 329
On the other hand, many scholars of global governance and public policy have criticized formal negotiation processes for giving an outsized voice
to wealthy countries and special interests within those countries while treating developing countries and the people within them unfairly. 330 By contrast,
informal implementation dynamism could create openings for contestation
by a broader set of actors, including developing countries, sub-state actors,
NGOs, technical experts, and the permanent staff of international organizations, which could in turn give greater voice to those disempowered by the
formal process. Further examples as well as a theoretical account are needed
to elucidate this hypothesis. Such an account could be drawn from relational
contracts, 331 dynamic statutory interpretation, 332 or the historical literature on
imperialism. 333 If this hypothesis holds water, then just as contract scholars
have suggested a “movement away from the notion of consent as the binding

329. See Boockmann & Thurner, supra note 12, at 113 (noting that there is “a trade-off between
treaty flexibility and commitment to the treaty”).
330. See, e.g., EMILY JONES ET AL., MANOEUVRING AT THE MARGINS: CONSTRAINTS FACED
BY SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2010); Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 1 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009); AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT &
WTO (2003).
331. Wessel, supra note 143, at 154; see also Speidel, supra note 145, at 375 (arguing “[c]omplete consent is a mirage” and, “[o]ver time, ‘gaps’ in the initial agreement will undoubtedly
emerge”); Macneil, supra note 141, at 900–01 (stating that the notion of initial consent at the time
of contract formation is often “stretch[ed] . . . beyond its actual bounds and by fictions to squeeze
later changes within an initial consent framework”).
332. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 13, 107 (noting the “archaeological . . . focus of traditional approaches to statutory interpretation is inspired in large part by anxiety that nonelected officials feel when they make policy decisions in a democracy”).
333. See, e.g., LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD
HISTORY, 1400–1900, at 3 (2002) (exploring how conquered and colonized groups responded to the
imposition of law by colonial power through various strategies including “advocacy within the system”). I thank Amalia Kessler for pointing out this literature.
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force and principal source of legal obligation,” international law scholars,
too, might need to look beyond consent for legitimacy. 334
V. CONCLUSION
I intend this Article to enrich our understanding of how treaties change
over time. The Article cautions against an analysis of treaties that begins and
ends with the treaty text, formal implementing mechanisms, and the written
decisions of authoritative adjudicatory bodies. It invites scholars to undertake longitudinal studies and to look deep into the bureaucracies and epistemic communities that shape how a treaty plays out in the world.
The history of international infectious disease regulation reveals a set of
ordinarily hidden actors and strategies whose interactions have made and remade treaties every day, even as those treaties appeared formally stable. Like
the ship of Theseus, whose decaying planks were replaced one by one until
none of the original pieces remained, infectious disease regulation shifted incrementally, from the ground up, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific
moment when change occurred. Uncovering the complex relationship between stability and change casts fresh light on foundational questions in international law and ushers in new inquiries for future exploration.

334. Crootof, supra note 10, at 277–88 (challenging the presumption that consent based treaties
are superior to custom).

